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ABSTRACT—Rape kits are important tools used to store the evidence that is 
collected from a victim’s body and clothing following a sexual assault. 
Although the DNA evidence stored in rape kits is crucial to rape 
investigations, police departments throughout the country have routinely 
failed to test rape kits. This remains true despite the national funding 
allocated specifically for rape kit testing. This widespread neglect hinders 
justice and renders community members unprotected from sexual violence. 
The national rape kit backlog has sparked legal challenges; six lawsuits have 
been filed against police departments for systematically refusing to test rape 
kits, alleging equal protection violations based on gender under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. This Note discusses the two lawsuits that have reached the circuit 
court level. These two suits illustrate the difficulty in establishing 
discriminatory intent—a necessary component of an equal protection claim. 
Ultimately, this Note argues that courts should recognize police refusal to 
test rape kits as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and should not require plaintiffs to plead a specific comparator 
to establish discriminatory intent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In police-department warehouses across the country, thousands of small 
cardboard boxes are stacked haphazardly on shelves from floor to ceiling, 
collecting dust.1  Rows and rows of boxes—“[ten] inches tall and a foot 
wide”—are tucked away, unopened and unexamined.2 Some have not been 
touched for more than thirty years.3 These are not boxes storing evidence 
from solved cases—these are “rape kits,” the colloquial name for the box 
containing the physical evidence that is collected after someone reports a 
sexual assault, that have never been tested.4 For many victims of rape, these 
boxes contain the only hope of ever identifying their assailant and obtaining 
justice. 5  Although they may be small, their importance cannot be 
overstated—rape kits contain crucial forensic evidence often necessary to 
solve sexual assault investigations.6 Yet instead of being sent to laboratories, 
 
 1  See, e.g., Barbara Bradley Hagerty, An Epidemic of Disbelief, ATLANTIC, Aug. 2019, at 74 
(describing a warehouse in Detroit with untested rape kits). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See infra Section I.A. 
 6 Stephanie Fulton, Note, The Rape Kit Backlog: The Continuous Hampering of Society’s Protection 
and Liberty Interests, 40 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 43, 45 (2018). 
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this evidence degrades in hot and musty warehouses—untested and 
neglected.7 
The criminal justice system and our society at large are currently 
grappling with how to effectively handle claims of rape and sexual assault. 
Rape is one of the most underreported crimes in the United States.8 Even 
when the odds are defied and rape is reported, victims are often disbelieved 
and no criminal charges materialize. 9  This remains true even when 
potentially corroborating physical evidence is present.10 In the last few years, 
reports have surfaced that a multitude of police departments across the 
country have neglected to test rape kits for DNA evidence.11 As this issue 
has gained widespread attention, victims have started suing the cities 
responsible.12 
Lawsuits have been filed over police departments’ systematic failure to 
test rape kits in six cities: San Francisco, Memphis, Houston, Austin, 
Baltimore, and the Village of Robbins, Illinois.13 The plaintiffs in these cases 
allege violations under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 14  The plaintiffs argue that police departments routinely 
 
 7 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 74. 
 8 The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAINN (2019), https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-
justice-system [https://perma.cc/D5JZ-54BV] (noting that about three out of four sexual assaults go 
unreported); see also LYNN LANGTON, MARCUS BERZOFSKY, CHRISTOPHER KREBS & HOPE SMILEY-
MCDONALD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE 
POLICE, 2006–2010, at 4 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vnrp0610.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YVK9-NCUD] (stating that 65% of rapes and sexual assaults went unreported in the 
specified time period in comparison with 56% of simple assaults, 44% of aggravated assaults, and 41% 
of robberies). The percentage of victims of violent crimes that did not report because they “believed the 
police would not or could not do anything to help doubled from 10% in 1994 to 20% in 2010.” Id. at 1. 
Victims listed police bias and police not thinking that “the crime was important enough to address” as 
reasons to not report. Id. at 3.  
 9  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (arguing that victims who report rape suffer from a “credibility discount” 
in which police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges disbelieve victims due to prejudice and thus fail 
to pursue charges); Hagerty, supra note 1, at 74. 
 10 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 33–35. 
 11 See Hagerty, supra note 1, at 79.  
 12 See infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text for an explanation of this Note’s focus on women. 
See Hagerty, supra note 1, at 84 (describing civil lawsuits by sexual assault victims after police or 
prosecutors refused to investigate or charge their claims). 
 13 Beckwith v. City of Houston, 790 F. App’x 568, 570–71 (5th Cir. 2019); Doe v. City of Memphis, 
928 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2019); Marlowe v. City of San Francisco, 753 F. App’x 479, 479 (9th Cir. 
2019); Borkowski v. Baltimore County, 414 F. Supp. 3d 788, 797 (D. Md. 2019); Complaint at 1–2, 
Smith v. City of Austin, No. 18-CV-00505-LY (W.D. Tex. June 18, 2018) [hereinafter Smith Complaint]; 
Complaint at 10, Doe v. Village of Robbins, No. 17-CV-00353 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter 
Village of Robbins Complaint]. 
 14  Sources cited supra note 13. 
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discriminate against victims of rape—who are overwhelmingly female—by 
deprioritizing proper testing and investigation of cases, thus denying them 
equal protection of the law based on their gender.15 Two of these suits have 
led to disparate results in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. Though the plaintiffs 
in the two cases pled very similar claims, the Sixth Circuit permitted the case 
to move into discovery16 while the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case.17 The 
difference in outcomes reflects confusion in the lower courts as to what 
evidence plaintiffs must produce in order to establish discriminatory intent. 
The Supreme Court recently denied a writ of certiorari to resolve the discord 
and clarify the standard for plaintiffs in similar cases.18 However, the issue 
of untested rape kits is ubiquitous; hundreds of thousands of untested kits 
have been found in cities across the country.19 Thus, despite the denial of 
certiorari, more lawsuits will likely arise as this issue continues to gain 
attention. This Note argues that the Supreme Court should accept certiorari 
on a future case in order to set a standard that prevents unequal access to 
justice. 
This Note builds on prior scholarship regarding the Equal Protection 
Clause and its potential to be an effective tool for victims who are denied 
police protections to seek redress. Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer has 
argued that the 39th Congress—the Congress that embedded the Equal 
Protection Clause within the Fourteenth Amendment—was centrally 
concerned with the Clause protecting citizens from violence through 
providing equal access to police protections. 20  She describes how the 
Supreme Court has moved away from this original “protection model” 
towards an “anti-classification approach”—one that focuses equal protection 
 
 15 Sources cited supra note 13. 
 16 City of Memphis, 928 F.3d at 485. 
 17 Marlowe v. City of San Francisco, 753 F. App’x 479, 479 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
244 (2019). 
 18 Marlowe, 140 S. Ct. at 244; Nicholas Iovino, Supreme Court Asked to Revive Lawsuit over Rape-
Kit Backlog, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 31, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/supreme-
court-asked-to-revive-lawsuit-over-rape-kit-backlog [https://perma.cc/VH4G-SQBS]. 
 19  See Where the Backlog Exists and What’s Happening to End It, END THE BACKLOG, 
http://www.endthebacklog.org/backlog/where-backlog-exists-and-whats-happening-end-it 
[https://perma.cc/2LRK-N4V9]; Meaghan Ybos, No Backlog: Why the Epidemic of Untested Rape Kits 
Is Not a Symbol of Insufficient Police Budgets but Instead a Failure to Investigate Rape, APPEAL (Oct. 
11, 2017), https://theappeal.org/no-backlog-why-the-epidemic-of-untested-rape-kits-is-not-a-symbol-of-
insufficient-police-budgets-but-instead-a-failure-to-investigate-rape [https://perma.cc/HQ3Y-TV4K]. 
 20 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287, 
1299–1301 (2016) (noting that “equal protection ‘at its core affirms the rights of victims to be equally 
protected by government from criminals’” (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 102 (2000))). 
115:1781 (2021) Untested and Neglected 
1785 
doctrine on prohibiting legislative and administrative discrimination.21 The 
Court’s anticlassification model requires showing the intent to discriminate, 
which she claims is often an “insurmountable barrier” when it comes to 
police bias.22 Despite this obstacle, Professor Tuerkheimer illustrates that 
since 2009, the Justice Department has been investigating and intervening 
when police departments systemically fail to address gender violence, 
specifically labeling this failure as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 23  Professor Tuerkheimer is cautiously optimistic that this could 
signal a reemergence of the “protection model” in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.24 In a later article, Professor Tuerkheimer posited that Heather 
Marlowe’s case in the Ninth Circuit, discussed at length later in this Note, 
could foreshadow a new “model for future Equal Protection litigation.”25 
This Note expands on Professor Tuerkheimer’s conception for future 
litigation by exposing the central obstacle to establishing discriminatory 
intent in equal protection claims based on police failure to test rape kits: the 
role of comparators. In discrimination jurisprudence, comparators are 
individuals who are similar to the plaintiff in all respects except they are not 
members of the plaintiff’s protected class. 26  Thus, disparate treatment 
between the plaintiff and comparator evinces discriminatory intent.27 While 
comparators can provide useful evidence of discrimination, courts 
increasingly rely on them as the sole means of establishing discriminatory 
intent, often to the detriment of litigants.28 
Notwithstanding discriminatory intent, the elements of a successful 
equal protection claim are present in this type of litigation. Supreme Court 
precedent establishes that police withholding protective services is sufficient 
 
 21 Id. at 1303–04. 
 22 Id. at 1306. Milli Kanani Hansen has similarly argued that an equal protection claim based on the 
failure to test rape kits is unlikely to be successful given the high bar to show intent to discriminate. Milli 
Kanani Hansen, Note, Testing Justice: Prospects for Constitutional Claims by Victims Whose Rape Kits 
Remain Untested, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 943, 983–85 (2011). 
 23 Tuerkheimer, supra note 20, at 1310–34. 
 24 Id. at 1334–35. 
 25 Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 53. 
 26  Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731 (2011). For 
example, a Black job applicant seeking to bring a discrimination claim would likely rely on white 
applicants with the same qualifications as her comparator. The comparator would differ from the plaintiff 
only in race, thus allowing a judge or jury to infer race-based discrimination based on disparate treatment.  
 27 See id.  
 28 See generally id. (discussing why courts rely on comparators to establish discriminatory intent and 
the shortfalls of this approach); see also infra Section II.A (providing more information on comparators). 
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to constitute a custom or practice under § 1983 litigation.29 Despite the lack 
of precedent on this exact issue, the refusal to test rape kits would likely not 
survive intermediate scrutiny based on gender. 30  Therefore, the biggest 
barrier to successful equal protection claims of this nature is requiring 
comparator evidence to show discriminatory intent. 31  Although still a 
requirement in the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit allows plaintiffs to 
proceed on their claims without pleading specific facts pertaining to 
comparators.32 This Note expands upon prior scholarship to argue that courts 
can uphold the core tenets of equal protection while maintaining its current 
framework by allowing discriminatory intent to be shown without 
comparators. This Note posits that while comparators may be sufficient to 
show discrimination, they should not be required. 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I documents the widespread 
refusal by police to investigate rape complaints, as evidenced by warehouses 
full of untested rape kits. After demonstrating the importance of rape kits, it 
explores the prevailing theory that police bias causes officers to disbelieve 
reports of rape at disproportionately high levels and thus prematurely end 
investigations before rape kits are tested. Part II provides an overview of 
gender-based equal protection doctrine. It then introduces two circuit cases 
that have addressed municipalities’ failure to test rape kits, resulting in 
different pleading standards. Part III analyzes the disparities between the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ approaches. Then, it proposes a path forward for 
successful equal protection claims based on police failure to test rape kits. 
By exploring this underdeveloped area of equal protection law, this Note 
ultimately argues that systematically refusing to test rape kits for potentially 
inculpatory evidence violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
 29 See infra Section III.B (explaining that denial of police protective services based on a protected 
trait violates the Equal Protection Clause).  
 30 See infra Section III.C (explaining that intermediate scrutiny is the constitutional standard for 
gender-discrimination cases). 
 31 See Goldberg, supra note 26, at 751 (explaining that the comparator requirement is an obstacle to 
discrimination claims “both practically and conceptually”). 
 32 Compare Doe v. City of Memphis, 928 F.3d 481, 494, 496 (6th Cir. 2019) (allowing plaintiffs to 
reach discovery), with Marlowe v. City of San Francisco, 753 F. App’x 479, 479–80 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim). 
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I. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A RAPE REPORT 
Every seventy-three seconds someone is sexually assaulted in the 
United States.33 “[One] out of every [six] American women has been the 
victim of an attempted or completed rape in her lifetime.”34 Despite these 
sobering statistics, less than 0.5% of rapes will make it through the criminal 
justice system to conviction.35 One of the goals of the criminal justice system 
is to protect victims of crimes; however, more often than not the system 
subjects rape victims to institutionalized sexism, beginning with their 
treatment by the police and continuing throughout the legal process.36 One 
palpable example of this ongoing injustice is the failure of police officers to 
test rape kits.37 This Part begins by defining the concept of a rape kit and 
detailing its importance to police investigations of rape. It then describes the 
pervasive police bias against victims of sexual assault and the resulting 
failure to investigate reports and test rape kits for evidence. Lastly, it argues 
that this failure constitutes a threat to public safety and the credibility of the 
criminal justice system. 
A. The Importance of Rape Kits 
Rape kits contain not only vital evidence for police investigations but 
also the opportunity to obtain justice for victims. “Rape kit” is the common 
term for the box of evidence that is collected during a forensic sexual assault 
 
 33 Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/GM7L-X4MQ]. Due to the 
nature of quoting statistics or other materials that use the terms “rape” and “sexual assault” 
interchangeably, rape and sexual assault are also used interchangeably throughout this Note. 
 34  See Scope of the Problem: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scope-problem 
[https://perma.cc/KS8U-628Z]; MICHELE C. BLACK, KATHLEEN C. BASILE, MATTHEW J. BREIDING, 
SHARON G. SMITH, MIKEL L. WALTERS, MELISSA T. MERRICK, JIERU CHEN & MARK R. STEVENS, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ 
NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV2M-ZUQB] (finding that 18.3% of women reported 
being raped at some point in their lifetime). Although men, of course, are also raped (1.4% of men 
reported being raped at some point their lifetime), the focus of this Note is an equal protection violation 
based on gender. Id. Therefore, this discussion focuses on the impact of this violation on women and 
generally uses female pronouns when discussing victims of rape. 
 35 The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8.  
 36 See LaVerne McQuiller Williams, Women, Crime, and Criminal Justice, 32 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 
6, 6, 9–12 (2004). 
 37 Lux Alptraum, Opening a Pandora’s Box of Truths About Rape Kits, VOX (Feb. 19, 2020, 6:50 
AM), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2020/2/12/21121379/rape-kits-aliza-shvarts-safe-kits-anthem-
exhibit [https://perma.cc/RP8T-N2BA] (stating that despite rape kits being “a concrete object that could 
render the truth unimpeachable” and “often the only physical evidence a survivor can present in court, . . . 
they’re frequently lost in the system”).  
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examination.38 When a victim reports a sexual assault to the police, she is 
given the option to go to a hospital to undergo a sexual assault examination39 
because “[t]he victim’s body is a part of the sexual assault crime scene” and 
can contain crucial forensic evidence. 40  The sexual assault examination, 
which can last hours, is typically conducted by a specialized Sexual Assault 
Nurse Examiner (SANE)41 and includes an invasive physical examination for 
any evidence of the assault.42 This will often include a vaginal exam, photos 
of injuries, and samples of hair fibers, blood, semen, and saliva.43  Most 
importantly, this evidence can contain the DNA of the victim’s attacker as 
well as corroborating physical evidence of assault.44 DNA is a “powerful tool 
to solve and prevent [future] crime” because it can both identify the attacker 
and tie him to other crime scenes to determine if he is a serial offender.45 A 
DNA identification may also be used to exonerate innocent suspects.46 
 
 38  What Is a Sexual Assault Forensic Exam?, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/rape-kit 
[https://perma.cc/YP4H-TWRG]. 
 39 Fulton, supra note 6, at 44–45. Most DNA evidence must be collected within seventy-two hours 
to be viable; however, other forensic evidence can still be collected after this timeframe. What Is a Sexual 
Assault Forensic Exam?, supra note 38. Bathing or showering following an assault—often an instinctual 
reaction—can destroy forensic evidence. See id. The limited time frame and circumstances under which 
evidence can be collected further underscores how rare it is to have a viable rape kit and thus how 
devastating it can be when it is never tested. 
 40 Fulton, supra note 6, at 44. 
 41 See Glenne Ellen Fucci, Note, No Law and No Order: Local, State and Federal Government 
Responses to the United States Rape Kit Backlog Crisis, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 193, 
196 (2015). 
 42 Fulton, supra note 6, at 45 (“The testing consists of a . . . nurse photographing, swabbing, and 
conducting an exhaustive and invasive exam of the victim’s full body. . . . Unfortunately for the victim, 
the process takes many grueling hours to complete.”). 
 43 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 34.  
 44 Hansen, supra note 22, at 943–44 (“Rape kits help identify unknown assailants, confirm the 
presence of a known suspect’s DNA, corroborate a victim’s version of events in a contested assault, and 
exonerate innocent suspects.”). 
 45 Fulton, supra note 6, at 45 (“The DNA evidence can be, and is frequently, a ‘powerful tool to solve 
and prevent [future] crime.’ The rape kit can identify the assailant . . . . It affirms the victim’s account of 
the attack, providing her with justice. The rape kit can connect the attacker to other crime scenes, and 
potentially identify repeat offenders.” (quoting What Is a Rape Kit Backlog?, END THE BACKLOG, 
http://www.endthebacklog.org/backlog/what-rape-kit-backlog [https://perma.cc/CG3Y-8RFW])). 
 46 Hansen, supra note 22, at 943–44. Since the late 1980s, DNA has been accepted as evidence in 
criminal cases. Id. at 947–48. DNA profiles are stored in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)—
the national DNA databank—to which samples are compared in hopes of finding a match. Tom Jackman, 
Advocates Implore Congress to Reauthorize Funds for Backlogged DNA Rape Kits Before Sept. 30 
Expiration, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-
law/2019/09/07/advocates-implore-congress-reauthorize-funds-backlogged-dna-rape-kits-before-sept-
expiration [https://perma.cc/L33B-ABQE] (reporting that there are about 17 million profiles in CODIS); 
Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-
analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/CS8V-YR8Z]. 
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Following the examination, evidence recovered from the victim’s body 
and clothes is sealed up and stored, typically in a rectangular cardboard box.47 
The rape kit is then turned over to the police, who, in theory, should send the 
rape kit to a laboratory for testing as part of their investigation.48 However, 
despite DNA’s potential probative value and reliability, police officers 
regularly leave rape kits to sit on shelves in warehouses, untested, as the 
forensic evidence slowly loses its viability. As many as 400,000 rape kits 
have never been tested by police departments in the United States,49 which is 
often referred to as a national “rape kit backlog.” 50  This estimate is 
potentially conservative because there is no comprehensive national data on 
the size of the rape kit backlog. 
Yet it is clear that this malfeasance occurs nationwide. In 1999, New 
York City’s police storage facilities housed roughly 16,000 untested rape 
kits.51 In 2009, Detroit had a backlog of 11,341 untested rape kits, some 
dating back over thirty years,52 and Los Angeles County had approximately 
12,669 untested rape kits. 53  In 2014, Memphis had a backlog of 7,000 
untested rape kits. 54  Although some larger cities, in response to public 
pressure, have taken steps to determine the size of their backlog and 
eliminate it,55 many smaller cities or towns have not even begun the process 
 
 47 Lynn Hecht Schafran, Medical Forensic Sexual Assault Examinations: What Are They, and What 
Can They Tell the Courts?, 54 JUDGES’ J. 16, 17–18 (2015). 
 48 Police officers in most states have the sole discretion to decide whether to send rape kits for testing. 
See Fulton, supra note 6, at 46. Currently, only five states make rape kit testing mandatory. Corey 
Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, 58 B.C. L. REV. 205, 207 (2017). There is no federal law that 
mandates “testing, tracking, or reporting of rape kit[s].” Fucci, supra note 41, at 219. 
 49 See Caitlin Dickson, How the U.S. Ended up with 400,000 Untested Rape Kits, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 
14, 2017, 2:51 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-ended-up-with-400000-untested-rape-
kits [https://perma.cc/33TU-YQZ3]. 
 50 Madison Pauly, Women All over the Country Are Suing Police for Failing to Test Their Rape Kits, 
MOTHER JONES (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/10/women-all-over-
the-country-are-suing-police-for-failing-to-test-their-rape-kits [https://perma.cc/NTR6-6D8A]. One 
woman whose rape kit was not tested argued that “backlog” is really just “a euphemism for police 
neglect.” Id. 
 51 Fucci, supra note 41, at 198. 
 52 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 74. 
 53 Fucci, supra note 41, at 198. 
 54 Id. at 209. 
 55 For example, Detroit is one city that has eliminated its backlog—after ten years, all 11,341 rape 
kits have been tested. Sarah Cwiek, After Ten Years, Detroit Rape Kit Backlog Cleared, but Still “a Long 
Way to Go,” NPR (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/after-ten-years-detroit-rape-kit-
backlog-cleared-still-long-way-go [https://perma.cc/6J4W-U5TJ]. This has led to 197 convictions and a 
finding of 824 repeat offenders. Id.  
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of counting their untested rape kits. 56  Therefore, the magnitude of the 
problem is potentially even worse than predicted. 
Despite federal funds specifically designated to test rape kits, the 
backlogs persist, leading to the conclusion that police departments have other 
motives for their neglect.57  Law enforcement officials blame the lack of 
testing on high laboratory costs,58 but this argument founders due to the 
federal funds that have been designated specifically for rape kit testing. For 
instance, in 2004, Congress passed the Debbie Smith Act in order “to assess 
the extent of the backlog in DNA analysis of rape kits and to improve 
investigation and prosecution of sexual assault with DNA evidence.”59 The 
Act includes the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program, which 
provides specific funding to test rape kits across the United States.60 This 
allocation of substantial federal funds to help state and local governments 
work through DNA evidence backlogs has led some to call the Act “the most 
 
 56  Fucci, supra note 41, at 200 (“[T]hese numbers fail to tell the whole story because only some of 
the largest cities in the nation have been put under public and governmental scrutiny to eliminate their 
backlogs. These statistics fail to explain how many small cities, cities with limited resources, counties in 
rural areas and towns with a small police force also have handled their backlogged kits. The limited 
number of cities which have undertaken testing of their backlogged kits, counting their untested kits or 
eliminating their backlog entirely, indicates that the majority of localities have not taken steps to analyze 
their backlog, nor have they made this a high priority issue.”). 
 57  REBECCA CAMPBELL, GIANNINA FEHLER-CABRAL, STEVEN J. PIERCE, DHRUV B. SHARMA, 
DEBORAH BYBEE, JESSICA SHAW, SHEENA HORSFORD & HANNAH FEENEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE 
DETROIT SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT (SAK) ACTION RESEARCH PROJECT (ARP), FINAL REPORT 101–37 
(2015) (finding that “resource depletion” is not the sole cause of untested rape kits) (“When we asked 
stakeholders why they thought there were so many unsubmitted SAKs in Detroit, nearly all mentioned 
that gender was undoubtedly a key factor. As one stakeholder said, ‘I think that’s probably the #1 reason 
[why kits aren’t submitted], it affects mostly women . . . if men were getting raped, I think that it wouldn’t 
be like that.’ Similarly, another member of the collaborative said, ‘It’s not that complicated to figure 
out . . . this is a crime that affects women, and in this city, that means Black women, poor Black 
women . . . there’s a good chunk of the explanation right there.’”). 
 58 Hansen, supra note 22, at 949. 
 59 Fucci, supra note 41, at 218 (citing Debbie Smith Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13701); Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54. The Debbie Smith Act was named for 
a survivor of sexual assault who advocated for legislation after the DNA evidence in her rape kit was 
crucial to later identifying and prosecuting her attacker. Fucci, supra note 41, at 218. 
 60 Fucci, supra note 41, at 218. While the Debbie Smith Act has helped reduce the backlog, activists 
are puzzled as to why the backlog persists. Sofia Resnick, Rape Kits: A Decade and A Billion Dollars 
Later, Why Can’t We Fix the Backlog?, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (May 19, 2015, 4:05 PM). 
https://rewirenewsgroup.com/article/2015/05/19/rape-kits-decade-billion-dollars-later-cant-fix-backlog/ 
[https://perma.cc/B8PB-5G8K]. The Government Accountability Office investigated and found that the 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), which oversees the Act, “could not adequately explain its DNA-related 
grant-funding decisions and could not adequately determine if award recipients met their funding goals 
outlined in their grant applications.” Id. One explanation may be that Debbie Smith Act funding is not 
exclusively earmarked for rape kits but can be used for DNA testing more generally. Id.  
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important anti-rape legislation ever signed into law.”61 Yet despite funds 
being made available, the backlogs have persisted. 62  In 2013, Congress 
passed the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Reporting (SAFER) Act, 
which included best practices to manage and test rape kits.63 One goal of the 
SAFER Act was to streamline funds more directly to state and local 
governments in order to clear their rape kit backlogs.64 In 2016, President 
Obama announced an additional $41 million would be allocated from the 
Justice Department’s Grant Program for a “Sexual Assault Kit Initiative” to 
help state and local law enforcement test backlogged rape kits.65 Yet the 
ongoing backlog suggests that many cities have not taken advantage of these 
available funds.66 Much of the money has instead been spent on general DNA 
testing improvements, administrative costs, or even unrelated purposes.67 
Thus, the question remains: why do police departments neglect rape kits? 
Researchers who have worked with and helped train the police point to one 
factor: “law enforcement’s abiding skepticism of women who report being 
raped.”68 Consequently, despite the importance and promise of rape kits, 
police bias more often than not stands in the way of justice. 
 
 61 Fucci, supra note 41, at 218 (“[S]ome have called the Debbie Smith Act ‘the most important anti-
rape legislation ever signed into law because it provides substantial federal funds to help states and 
localities work through DNA evidence backlogs.’” (quoting Press Release, Carolyn B. Maloney, Bill to 
Reauthorize Maloney’s Debbie Smith Act Headed for President’s Desk (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/bill-to-reauthorize-maloney-s-debbie-smith-act-
headed-for-president-s [https://perma.cc/XG5S-GWYX])); see also Jackman, supra note 46 (noting that 
around 42% of DNA matches in the national database “came as a direct result of the Debbie Smith Act,” 
establishing suspects for “about 200,000 cases which might otherwise have gone unsolved”). 
 62  See Where the Backlog Exists and What’s Happening to End It, END THE BACKLOG, 
http://www.endthebacklog.org/backlog/where-backlog-exists-and-whats-happening-end-it 
[https://perma.cc/EG4H-ZDX3], for the most up-to-date information regarding the size of the backlog. 
 63  Fulton, supra note 6, at 48 (“[T]he SAFER Act outlines parameters for the identification, 
prioritization, and testing periods of rape kits . . . including communication procedures for conveying 
valuable information about the collections, and auditing protocols for rape kits.” (footnote omitted)). 
 64 See Fucci, supra note 41, at 219. 
 65 Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Investments to Reduce the National Rape Kit Backlog and 
Combat Violence Against Women, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/16/fact-sheet-investments-reduce-
national-rape-kit-backlog-and-combat-viole [https://perma.cc/5SPQ-KBT9]. 
 66 Fucci, supra note 41, at 219–20 (“[P]umping millions of dollars into the backlog did not lead to 
national clearance, suggesting that the backlog does not exist purely because of a lack of financial 
resources.”). 
 67 Steve Reilly, No Action on Rape Kits Despite New Laws, Federal Money, USA TODAY (July 17, 
2017, 7:20 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/17/1b--rape-kit-funding-not-being-
spent--fix-problem/29902283 [https://perma.cc/NMF3-R3GB]. 
 68 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 81. 
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B. The Impact of Police Bias 
Research indicates that police hold negative and prejudicial attitudes 
toward victims of sexual assault, which causes police to “blame the victim, 
question the victim’s credibility, imply that the victim deserved being raped, 
denigrate the victim, and trivialize the rape experience.”69 Police disbelieve 
rape victims far more than the general public70 and at a higher rate than other 
professionals involved in rape investigations.71 Thus, many rape cases are 
closed or ignored after the initial report to a police officer, which also means 
that the rape kits associated with those cases are not tested. Multiple studies 
illustrate that police officers wrongly believe that women lie about being 
raped in staggeringly high numbers.72 For example, in one survey of nearly 
900 police officers, more than half of the officers stated that 11% to 50% of 
sexual assault complainants lie about being assaulted, and 10% of 
respondents even asserted that the number of false reports is as high as 51% 
to 100%.73 In reality, false reports account for only about 2% to 6% of rape 
allegations.74 
 
 69 Barbara Nagel, Hisako Matsuo, Kevin P. McIntyre & Nancy Morrison, Attitudes Toward Victims 
of Rape: Effects of Gender, Race, Religion, and Social Class, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 725, 726 
(2005); Hagerty, supra note 1, at 81. 
 70 Studies show that the public generally believes that about 19%–22% of rape allegations are false, 
whereas police officers believe that 10%–50% are false in one study, 40%–80% in another study, and an 
average of 53% in a third study. Katie M. Edwards, Jessica A. Turchik, Christina M. Dardis, Nicole 
Reynolds & Christine A. Gidycz, Rape Myths: History, Individual and Institutional-Level Presence, and 
Implications for Change, 65 SEX ROLES 761, 767 (2011); Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 16; Charlie 
Huntington, Alan Berkowitz & Lindsay Orchowski, False Accusations of Sexual Assault: Prevalence, 
Misperceptions, and Implications for Prevention Work with Men and Boys, in ENGAGING BOYS AND MEN 
IN SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3) (on file with journal). See infra 
note 74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the actual statistics on false reporting. 
 71 Yung, supra note 48, at 209 (referring to statistics regarding lawyers, doctors, and counselors). 
 72  See, e.g., MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE VISITING FELLOWSHIP: 
POLICE INVESTIGATION OF RAPE—ROADBLOCKS AND SOLUTIONS 11, 27–28 (2010) (presenting a study 
of forty-nine police officers who specialized in sexual assault revealing that more than half of those with 
less than seven years of experience believed that 40%–80% of sexual assault complaints were false). 
Other studies “have found that officers often hold the ‘baseline expectation that approximately [60%] of 
complainants are either untruthful or mistaken.’” Hansen, supra note 22, at 944. 
 73  Amy Dellinger Page, Gateway to Reform? Policy Implications of Police Officers’ Attitudes 
Toward Rape, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 44, 52, 55 (2008). 
 74 See David Lisak, Lori Gardinier, Sarah C. Nicksa & Ashley M. Cote, False Allegations of Sexual 
Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1329–30 
(2010) (finding that 5.9% of rape reports to a university police department were false and collecting 
studies with similar figures); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of 
a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1028 (1991) (noting that 2% of rape 
reports are estimated to be false). Additionally, “there is no empirical data to prove that there are more 
false charges of rape than of any other violent crime.” Torrey, supra, at 1028. Many scholars believe the 
real numbers for false rape reports could be even lower due to the difficulties inherent in calculating false 
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As the first point of contact in the criminal justice system, police are in 
the unique and powerful position of deciding which cases to advance and 
which cases to drop without further investigation.75 Thus, it is particularly 
problematic that police officers, who often lack training on dealing with 
sexual assault cases, 76  frequently rely on erroneous beliefs about victim 
credibility to conclude that rape complaints are false.77 Police officers often 
make this determination without investigating or, in some cases, even 
interviewing the victim.78 When police do conduct investigations, studies 
have shown that they are less likely to believe victims who do not exhibit the 
stereotypical behaviors they anticipate, such as fear, anger, crying intensely, 
or lack of hesitation.79 One Detroit detective stated that “a victim should be 
‘a complete hot mess. They should be crying. They should be very, very 
traumatized.’”80 But each victim has a different reaction to assault, and often 
it does not match this description. 81  Even when victims have displayed 
 
reports. Often the rates of false accusations rely on either a police officer’s assessment that a report was 
false or an accuser recanting; however, neither of these measures definitively indicates that the accusation 
was in fact false. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 17–18; Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, 
Rape Myths: In Review, 18 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 133, 135–36 (1994). Some victims recant accusations out 
of fear of retaliation, public ridicule, or even pressure from the police themselves. See Ken Armstrong & 
T. Christian Miller, An Unbelievable Story of Rape, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 16, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/12/16/an-unbelievable-story-of-rape [https://perma.cc/PEW3-
XXQX]. 
 75 Yung, supra note 48, at 206 (“Police across the United States regularly act as hostile gatekeepers 
who prevent rape complaints from advancing through the criminal justice system by fervently policing 
the culturally disputed concept of ‘rape.’”). 
 76  See ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD: SEXUAL ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND 
POLICING 10–11, 35–36 (2015) (recommending training in trauma, cultural sensitivity, bias, primary-
aggressor analysis, and interviewing based on survey results from over 900 people, including advocates, 
service providers, attorneys, and people working in membership-based organizations, regarding concerns 
and improvements for policing domestic violence and sexual assault). 
 77 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 74.  
 78 Id. at 77, 83 (noting that in 65% of rape cases in Minneapolis, “investigators failed to interview 
the victim,” and in 40% of cases in Cleveland, “detectives never contacted the victim” and in 75% “they 
never interviewed her”). 
 79 Fulton, supra note 6, at 47–48 (“A ten-year research study of reported instances of sexual assault 
inform us that when victims lack or do not express stereotypical behaviors anticipated by police, such as 
demonstrating fear or anger, crying intensely, or reporting the crime without hesitation, the police were 
more inclined to believe the victim was lying and constructing a fabricated report.”).  
 80 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 84. 
 81 PATRICIA L. FANFLIK, OFF. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, VICTIM RESPONSES TO SEXUAL 
ASSAULT: COUNTERINTUITIVE OR SIMPLY ADAPTIVE? 2 (2007), https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications/2018-10/pub_victim_responses_sexual_assault.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R8B-RVVU]. 
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emotional reactions, some surveyed officers have actually weighed this 
against their credibility if they became “overemotional.”82 
One of the reasons that police officers disbelieve rape victims at such 
high rates is sexism. When reading police reports from Los Angeles and 
Detroit and interviewing detectives, researchers found a “subterranean river 
of chauvinism” in which “the fate of a rape case usually depends on the 
detective’s . . . view of the victim—not the alleged perpetrator.” 83  Many 
officers in this study described a “righteous victim” who they would take 
seriously—“[a] woman who [did not] know her assailant, who fought back, 
[and] who has a clean record.”84 However, four out of five victims of rape 
know their assailant.85 Because police are likely to severely underestimate 
this number,86 their image of the “righteous victim” has very little overlap 
with victims in actual rape cases. One officer described acquaintance 
complaints as reflecting “buyer’s remorse,” meaning a woman who had been 
out drinking “ha[d] sex with a man ‘willingly’ and later regret[ted] it.”87 
Indeed, 19.7% of officers surveyed agreed or did not disagree that “many 
women secretly wish to be raped,” and 34.2% agreed or did not disagree that 
“promiscuous” women with “bad reputations” make the most rape 
complaints.88 On top of this deeply entrenched sexism, many victims must 
also face added layers of skepticism and discrimination as racial or religious 
minorities, members of the LGBTQIA+ community, immigrants, or sex 
workers.89 
 
 82 See Morgan Namian, Hypermasculine Police and Vulnerable Victims: The Detrimental Impact of 
Police Ideologies on the Rape Reporting Process, 40 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 80, 102 (2018) (citing Emma 
Sleath & Ray Bull, Police Perceptions of Rape Victims and the Impact on Case Decision Making: A 
Systematic Review, 34 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 102, 108 (2017)) (“Victims who have emotional 
reactions during the reporting process were viewed as more credible; however, overemotional reactions 
were viewed as cutting against credibility, suggesting that the rape claim was false.”). 
 83 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 83. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Perpetrators of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/perpetrators-
sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/2G49-FDZU]; Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the 
Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 
921–22 (2001). Even if the identity of a rapist is known, testing rape kits can still provide the valuable 
corroborative evidence of physical trauma needed to pursue charges. See Hansen, supra note 22, at 943–
44. It can also validate the victim’s experience and signal a response that the community and government 
will take her assault seriously. See id. at 958. 
 86 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 29–30, 30 n.161.  
 87 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 83–84. 
 88 Amy Dellinger Page, Judging Women and Defining Crime: Police Officers’ Attitudes Toward 
Women and Rape, 28 SOCIO. SPECTRUM 389, 402 tbl.4 (2008). 
 89 ACLU, supra note 76, at 17–24 (including survey and anecdotal evidence regarding police bias 
against racial minorities, immigrants, Muslims, LGBTQ people, poor people, Native Americans, non-
English speakers, sex workers, youth survivors, and survivors with mental-health or substance-abuse 
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These statistics and anecdotal findings are apparent in police 
departments across various cities and states. An Idaho sheriff stated that “the 
majority of our rapes that are called in[] are actually consensual sex.” 90 
Similarly, a college police chief in Georgia asserted that “[m]ost of these 
sexual assaults are women waking up the next morning with a guilt complex. 
That ain’t rape, that’s being stupid. When the dust settles, it was all 
consensual.”91 Rebecca Campbell, a professor of psychology at Michigan 
State University who analyzed police responses to reports of rape in multiple 
cities, stated that “[the police] fundamentally did not believe what happened 
to [victims] was a crime, they did not believe that what happened to them 
merited their attention. We read police reports where victims were called 
bitches, hoes, whores, heifers.”92 Police officers’ prejudice against victims of 
rape and sexual assault is most palpably manifested in the systematic failure 
to ensure that rape kits are tested. 
C. The Systemic Ramifications 
The failure of police to adequately investigate and address rape reports 
allows dangerous individuals to pose an ongoing threat to public safety, tells 
survivors that their rape does not matter, and sends a message to women that 
their “bodily integrity does not warrant protection.” 93  Police officers’ 
disregard of rape kits has broad impacts on the criminal justice system and 
public safety. About 125,000 rapes are reported each year across the 
country.94 Twenty percent of these reports lead to an arrest, and only 4% are 
referred to prosecutors.95 This means that the vast majority of rape cases end 
when police officers fail to adequately investigate the claims. Furthermore, 
only 23% of sexual assaults are even reported to the police to begin with, 
 
problems). Eighty percent of respondents surveyed “believed that police–community relations with 
marginalized communities influenced survivors’ willingness to call the police.” Id. at 1. 
 90 Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 32. 
 91 Id.  
 92 I AM EVIDENCE (HBO Documentary Films 2018). 
 93  Fucci, supra note 41, at 195 (“The failure of government, at all levels, allows dangerous 
individuals to pose a threat to communities while leaving survivors of sexual assault with the message 
that their attack, their rape, their violation of bodily integrity does not warrant protection or validation 
from those whom are charged with doing so.”). 
 94 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 74. 
 95 The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8; see also Hagerty, supra note 1, at 74 (“From 
the moment a woman calls 911 . . . a rape allegation becomes, at every stage, more likely to slide into an 
investigatory crevice. Police may try to discourage the victim from filing a report. If she insists on 
pursuing a case, it may not be assigned to a detective. If her case is assigned to a detective, it will likely 
close with little investigation and no arrest. If an arrest is made, the prosecutor may decline to bring 
charges: no trial, no conviction, no punishment.”). 
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meaning that over 540,000 rapes go unreported each year.96 Many victims do 
not report assaults because they do not believe they will receive justice.97 In 
one Department of Justice survey, nearly one in five women who had 
suffered a past sexual assault named the fact that “police would not or could 
not do anything to help” as the reason for not reporting their assault. 98 
Reporting an assault can be a difficult and humiliating experience. Thus, 
many victims will forgo reporting based on their assessments that their 
rapists would neither be arrested nor punished as a result.99 These statistics 
reflect a dangerous negative-feedback loop: police officers do not believe 
victims of assault, which discourages other victims from reporting to police 
officers and ultimately leaves offenders free to rape again with impunity.100 
In sexual assault cases, the presumption of guilt is often flipped; instead of 
assuming the suspect is guilty, many police assume that the victim is guilty 
of lying.101 In some cases, this presumption has even led police to charge 
women with false reporting—despite truthful reports that are later 
vindicated—instead of investigating and charging rapists. 102  The lack of 
investigation, potently symbolized by the refusal to test rape kits, adds to the 
trauma for survivors of sexual assault by making it clear that the criminal 
justice system will not protect them.103 
 
 96  The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8; Hagerty, supra note 1, at 74. 
 97 See W. David Allen, The Reporting and Underreporting of Rape, 73 S. ECON. J. 623, 627 (2007). 
 98 Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 28–29 (noting the statistic refers specifically to female college 
students ages eighteen to twenty-four); SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU 
OF JUST. STATS., RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995–
2013, at 1, 9 (2014) https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3ZC-
SNJ3]. 
 99 Yung, supra note 48, at 236. 
 100 Id. at 233 (“Ignoring rape complaints emboldens and reinforces the criminal behavior of rapists 
who can continue their sexual violence with impunity.”). 
 101 Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 33 (“The typical law enforcement investigation is guilt-presumptive 
(and potentially problematic for that reason). In sexual assault cases, this presumption is flipped. 
Investigators start from the proposition that the complainant is lying and act to confirm this belief.”). 
 102 See, e.g., Armstrong & Miller, supra note 74 (reporting that a woman was raped, forced to recant 
by the police, and prosecuted for making a false accusation before her rapist was apprehended for raping 
multiple other victims); Joanna Walters, An 11-Year-Old Reported Being Raped Twice, Wound Up with 
a Conviction, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/a-
seven-year-search-for-justice/2015/03/12/b1cccb30-abe9-11e4-abe8-e1ef60ca26de_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/7DWV-DJ9E] (reporting that an eleven-year-old girl was abducted and raped twice by 
the same men, but the police refused to investigate and charged her with lying and false reporting).  
 103 Hansen, supra note 22, at 958 (“The rape kit backlog has also ‘negatively affect[ed] women’s 
perceptions of justice by implying that the system does not care enough about them.’” (quoting Katherine 
L. Prevost O’Connor, Comment, Eliminating the Rape-Kit Backlog: Bringing Necessary Changes to the 
Criminal Justice System, 72 UMKC L. REV. 193, 199 (2003))). 
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Not only does a lack of testing harm present victims, but it also 
disadvantages future ones. By the time many rape kits are tested, the cases 
for which they were collected have passed beyond the statute of limitations 
to press charges.104 In 2009, when Los Angeles began testing its rape kit 
backlog, over 300 of the kits were older than the ten-year statute of 
limitations for prosecuting sexual assault.105 This neglect is significant, not 
only because it is horrific for survivors, but also because it undermines the 
credibility of the criminal justice system as a whole and threatens public 
safety.106 In fact, more than 99% of rapes do not end in a conviction.107 As 
more studies emerge, serial rapists are being found to be much more common 
than experts previously believed. 108  One study of 120 undetected rapists 
showed that 63% of them would go on to offend again.109 When rape kits are 
entered into the national DNA database, one in five “generates a match 
pointing to a serial rapist.”110 Rape “is by far the easiest violent crime to get 
away with.”111 The failure of police departments to test rape kits has inspired 
some victims to take matters into their own hands in the form of lawsuits 
against city police departments. 
II. LEGAL ACTION 
Six cities—San Francisco, Memphis, Houston, Austin, Baltimore, and 
the Village of Robbins, Illinois112—have been separately sued by women 
 
 104 Additionally, the evidence can degrade during this time, particularly if the rape kits are not stored 
properly. DNA Evidence: What Law Enforcement Officers Should Know, 249 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 10, 
11, 13 (2003) (noting that direct sunlight, heat, and humidity harm DNA evidence). This degradation can 
make later testing more difficult, if not impossible.  
 105 See Fucci, supra note 41, at 204. 
 106 See Lori Jane Gliha & Bryan Myers, ‘Is Rape Really Illegal’ When Rape Kits Go Untested?, AL 
JAZEERA AM. (May 6, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-
tonight/articles/2014/5/5/when-rape-kits-gountestedaisrapereallyillegala.html [https://perma.cc/6NNE-
YMBN]. In 2003, a woman was raped at knifepoint, but her rape kit was not tested for nearly ten years. 
Her rapist had raped at least six more women before eventually being arrested in 2012. Id. 
 107 The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8 (reporting that less than 0.5% of rapes will 
end in a conviction). Furthermore, incarceration is distributed unequally, as young white men are less 
likely to be punished than men of color. See, e.g., Gabby Bless, How Racial Bias Influenced Stanford 
Swimmer’s Rape Case, VICE (June 7, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjgg95/brock-
turner-rape-case-sentencing-racial-bias [https://perma.cc/8CQD-GWYC]. 
 108 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 78. 
 109 Hansen, supra note 22, at 946. 
 110 Jackman, supra note 46. 
 111 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 74 (noting that rape is easier to get away with than murder, robbery, or 
assault). 
 112 Beckwith v. City of Houston, 790 F. App’x 568, 570–71 (5th Cir. 2019); Doe v. City of Memphis, 
928 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2019); Marlowe v. City of San Francisco, 753 F. App’x 479, 479 (9th Cir. 
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whose rape kits were never tested and who allege violations under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These lawsuits, brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allege that police departments routinely 
discriminate against women by deprioritizing proper testing and 
investigation of rape cases, thereby denying those women equal protection 
of the law based on their gender.113 Some of these cases are still pending 
further litigation and review, 114  and one has resulted in an undisclosed 
settlement.115 However, two of these suits reached the circuit court level with 
disparate results. The Supreme Court recently denied a writ of certiorari to 
resolve the discord and chart a path forward for inevitable future litigation.116 
Despite the denial of certiorari, it is highly likely that more lawsuits will arise 
as this issue continues to gain attention and the backlog of rape kits continues 
to go untested. This Part will provide background on equal protection 
doctrine and introduce the Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit cases that have 
considered these equal protection claims. 
A. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause refers to this phrase within the Fourteenth 
Amendment: “nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”117 This clause was initially 
conceived in order to protect Black citizens from violence.118 But, in 1971, 
Reed v. Reed became the first Supreme Court case to declare that 
discrimination based on gender also violates the Equal Protection Clause and 
is therefore unconstitutional.119 Since Reed v. Reed, a number of cases have 
developed the law of gender-based equal protection. While the Supreme 
Court has resisted classifying women as a suspect class deserving of strict 
scrutiny, it has established a level of intermediate scrutiny for gender 
classifications.120 Intermediate scrutiny means that “state-sponsored gender 
 
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 244 (2019); Borkowski v. Baltimore County, 414 F. Supp. 3d 788, 797 (D. 
Md. 2019); Smith Complaint, supra note 13, at 1–2; Village of Robbins Complaint, supra note 13, at 10. 
 113 See sources cited supra note 112. 
 114 Borkowski, 414 F. Supp. 3d 788; Smith Complaint, supra note 13. As of March 2021, the lawsuit 
against Baltimore is in discovery, and the lawsuit against Austin has an appeal pending in the Fifth Circuit. 
 115 Consent Judgment at 1, Village of Robbins, No. 17-CV-00353 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2018). 
 116 Marlowe, 753 F. App’x 479, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 244 (2019); Iovino, supra note 18. 
 117 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 118 Tuerkheimer, supra note 20, at 1287. 
 119  404 U.S. 71, 73, 77 (1971) (finding unconstitutional a code that specified “males must be 
preferred to females” when appointing administrators of estates). 
 120 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing that gender is a quasi-suspect class that 
warrants intermediate scrutiny for equal protection claims). The Court has established groups of “discrete 
and insular minorities” as suspect or quasi-suspect protected classes warranting heightened constitutional 
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discrimination violates equal protection unless it serves important 
governmental objectives and . . . the discriminatory means employed are 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”121 In current 
jurisprudence, to bring a valid prima facie equal protection claim based on 
gender, a plaintiff must show that state action discriminated against her and 
did not advance important governmental objectives.122 Additionally, if the 
state action in question is not based on a facially discriminatory custom or 
practice, the plaintiff must show an intent or purpose to discriminate.123 
To make this showing, a plaintiff must establish that “she is a member 
of a protected class” and was intentionally discriminated against as a member 
of that protected class.124 Because the Court has already established that 
state-sponsored gender discrimination warrants intermediate scrutiny, 125 
women bringing these lawsuits are unquestionably members of a protected 
class based on their gender. Showing discriminatory intent, however, proves 
much more difficult. 
The courts have established three main avenues to show discriminatory 
intent, only the last of which is applicable to these cases. Nevertheless, 
understanding the first two avenues illuminates the difficultly of proving 
discriminatory intent in all but the most obvious cases. The first is express 
discrimination.126 A policy, custom, or practice that is facially discriminatory 
is sufficient to establish intent to discriminate; in Reed, for example, a statute 
that expressly preferred males over females to administer estates was held 
unconstitutional.127 The practice at issue here—police not testing rape kits—
is due to a discriminatory pattern of neglect, not a policy that instructs 
officers to treat rape victims differently. Therefore, these plaintiffs cannot 
allege express discrimination to prove discriminatory intent. 
The second method is to show that a facially neutral custom or practice 
has been applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner. 128  Since the 
 
scrutiny. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 121 Hansen, supra note 22, at 984 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000)). 
 122 See id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Doe v. City of Memphis, 928 F.3d 481, 487 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 125 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
 126 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (holding a statute that expressly stated a preference for 
males over females to administer estates violated equal protection). 
 127 Id. 
 128 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). 
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plaintiffs in these cases cannot point to a facially discriminatory policy, 
custom, or practice that causes the discriminatory impact, the plaintiffs must 
show that the state actors had discriminatory intent. If a clear pattern 
inexplicable on grounds other than gender discrimination results from a 
facially neutral state action, the intent is clearly discriminatory.129 However, 
these cases are rare;130 this only applies when the discrimination would be 
completely inexplicable on other grounds,131 which is a high bar. Because 
police can often rationalize their refusal to pursue rape complaints due to 
lack of funding, lack of evidence, or lack of resources, it is difficult to 
definitively establish intent. Therefore, cases based on the failure to test rape 
kits must fit within the third category. 
The third avenue is to show that a facially neutral custom or practice 
has an adverse effect on a protected class and was motivated by 
discriminatory animus.132 The discriminatory animus does not need to be the 
only ground for the adverse action, but it must be a motivating factor.133 Even 
if lack of funding, lack of evidence, or lack of resources also contributed to 
the refusal to pursue rape complaints, if this neglect was also motivated by 
discriminatory animus against women, that can be sufficient to prove 
discriminatory intent. Therefore, plaintiffs in cases regarding rape kits tend 
to pursue this avenue of showing discrimination. 
In order to determine whether discrimination was a motivating factor, 
courts look to both direct and circumstantial evidence of intent. 134  The 
totality of the facts, including whether the state action “bears more heavily 
on one [gender] than another,” is relevant to this analysis. 135  The vast 
majority of rape complaints are brought by women, and rape cases are the 
least indicted and convicted amongst all violent crimes. 136  However, 
 
 129 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); see also Yick 
Wo, 118 U.S. at 373; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1960). 
 130 See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
 131 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
 132 See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66. 
 133 Id. at 265. 
 134 Id. at 266. 
 135  Id. at 266–68 (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 242) (noting that other circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent are relevant factors, such as historical background, the events leading up to the 
challenged action, or departures from normal procedure).  
 136 Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape 
Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK L. REV. 467, 472 (2005) (“[R]ape is the least reported, least indicted, and least 
convicted non-property felony in America.”). 
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additional facts beyond those that show discriminatory impact must be 
shown in order to prove discriminatory intent.137 
Some courts have held that in order to show intent to discriminate, a 
plaintiff must provide evidence of comparators. 138  A comparator is an 
individual that is similarly situated to a member of the protected class but 
falls outside that class.139 The theory is that by proffering evidence of two 
similarly situated individuals—one in a protected class and one not—who 
are treated differently, the only explanation for their disparate treatment is 
the membership in a protected class, thereby proving intent.140 
The idea of a comparator is commonly associated with employment 
discrimination claims under Title VII, 141  but is also used by courts to 
establish intent to discriminate in equal protection claims.142 In McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Court first established the comparator 
framework used in employment discrimination litigation.143 In evaluating a 
discrimination claim brought by a Black employee, the Court explained that 
evidence that the employer treated comparable white workers better “would 
be ‘[e]specially relevant’ to showing discrimination.” 144  Courts have 
increasingly relied on the comparator standard to prove discriminatory 
intent,145 although definitions vary for how “similarly situated” a comparator 
must be to the member of the protected class.146 While some courts use a 
 
 137 Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious . . . discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”). 
 138  Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 839–49 (2002) (overviewing each circuit’s comparator 
requirement in employment discrimination cases); see also Goldberg, supra note 26, at 750 
(“[Comparators] constitute, to many courts, a threshold requirement of a discrimination claim and, in that 
sense, part of discrimination’s very definition. On this view, discrimination occurs only when an actor 
has differentiated between two groups of people because of a protected trait, which means that the absence 
of a comparator signals the absence of discrimination.”). 
 139 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).  
 140 See id. For example, if two employees have the exact same degree, qualifications, and job 
performance but the female employee is paid less, that can show intent to discriminate on the basis of 
sex.  
 141 Goldberg, supra note 26, at 743–49. 
 142 See, e.g., Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting female inmates’ 
equal protection claims without proceeding to the merits because they were not “similarly situated” to the 
male inmates). 
 143 Goldberg, supra note 26, at 745; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
 144 Goldberg, supra note 26, at 745 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). 
 145 Id. at 748–49 (observing that courts treat comparators “as their preferred lens for evaluating 
discrimination claims”). 
 146 Compare Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012) (using a “flexible, common-
sense” standard in employment discrimination cases that requires “sufficient commonalities on the key 
variables between the plaintiff and the would-be comparator to allow . . . comparison” (quoting 
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“strict” standard and others take a more “flexible” approach, the comparator 
requirement is often still relatively stringent in the equal protection 
context.147 As the use of comparators has grown, what began as merely a 
helpful heuristic for establishing discrimination has since become almost a 
“threshold requirement.”148 
However, some courts have held that comparators, while helpful, are 
not the only way to establish discriminatory intent and are unnecessary to 
establish a valid claim. 149  If other evidence establishes discrimination 
because of membership in a protected class, the court can still find intent 
without the need for a comparator. In two cases with very similar facts, the 
Sixth and the Ninth Circuits disagreed over whether a comparator should be 
a threshold requirement when assessing discriminatory intent. 
B. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ Approaches to Equal Protection Claims 
1. Doe v. City of Memphis 
On March 30, 2001, Jane Doe and her children were asleep in their 
home.150 Around 2:00 AM, an intruder violently kicked in a window and 
broke in.151 He then bound Doe’s arms and feet and sexually assaulted her 
multiple times.152 That very same day, “Doe reported the sexual assault to the 
Memphis Police Department [(MPD)].” 153  She was subsequently 
“transported to the Rape Crisis Center for treatment and the collection of 
 
Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007))), with Lewis v. City of Union City, 
918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding the proper test for evaluating comparators in employment 
discrimination claims is that they must be “similarly situated in all material respects” to the plaintiff). 
 147 See, e.g., David A. Perkins, The Similarly Situated Analysis for Equal Protection Claims Remains 
Stringent, 21 ILL. DEF. COUNS. Q. 31, 31–32 (2011) (describing the Seventh Circuit’s strict approach). 
Despite having a flexible standard in the employment discrimination context, the Seventh Circuit appears 
to have a stricter standard for comparators in equal protection claims. See Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 
649 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that while there is no “precise formula” under equal protection, 
“similarly situated individuals must be very similar indeed” (quoting LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village 
of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2010))). 
 148 Goldberg, supra note 26, at 750; see also Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving 
Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 204–06 (2009) (observing that, while not 
statutorily required, “the absence of a comparator is often fatal to a claim”). 
 149 See, e.g., Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 546 (4th Cir. 2003) (“However 
helpful a showing of a . . . comparator may be to proving a discrimination claim, it is not a necessary 
element of such a claim.”). 
 150 Second Amended Complaint at 10, Doe v. City of Memphis, No. 2:13-CV-03002, 2014 WL 
11514980 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 2014), rev’d, 928 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied, (6th Cir. July 
31, 2019). 
 151 Id.  
 152 Id.  
 153 Id.  
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evidence.”154 While at the Rape Crisis Center, a SANE nurse conducted a 
sexual assault examination resulting in a rape kit.155 An officer transported 
the rape kit to the MPD “ostensibly for testing and to be used as evidence” 
against the assailant.156 Yet “[o]ver the next thirteen . . . years, [the] City of 
Memphis never submitted . . . Doe’s [rape kit] for testing.”157 
Doe contacted the MPD multiple times to inquire about the status of her 
kit.158 She was informed that the DNA in her kit did not match any third 
parties. 159  However, she later discovered that her kit was never actually 
tested.160 MPD officers told her that the DNA did not result in a match in 
order to conceal the fact that her kit had not been tested and to prevent her 
from inquiring further.161 The man whose DNA was eventually matched to 
Doe’s rape kit had been convicted of multiple felonies prior to Doe’s assault, 
including aggravated rape.162 During the time that Doe’s rape kit remained 
untested, the rapist sexually assaulted other women.163 In February 2014, he 
was finally indicted for aggravated rape based in part on the DNA recovered 
from Doe’s rape kit.164 
In addition to Doe’s case, the MPD failed to test over 15,000 Sexual 
Assault Evidence Kits over a period of several decades, and a 
disproportionate number of the rape kits belonged to women.165 
2. The Sixth Circuit’s Analysis 
In 2013, Doe brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the city of 
Memphis had a “policy, practice and/or custom” of failing to submit sexual 
assault evidence kits for testing in violation of her constitutional rights.166 
The complaint alleged that the city of Memphis continually afforded less 
protection to female victims of rape and sexual assault than to victims of 
other crimes. 167  Doe represented a class consisting of at least 15,000 
women—including some of her rapist’s other victims—who reported sexual 
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 155 See id.  
 156 Id.  
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. at 11. 
 159 Id.  
 160 Id.  
 161 Id.  
 162 Id.  
 163 Id. at 12. 
 164 Id.  
 165 Id. at 17. 
 166 Complaint at 8, City of Memphis, 2014 WL 11514980. 
 167 Amended Complaint at 6–8, City of Memphis, 2014 WL 11514980. 
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assaults and whose rape kits were turned over to the Memphis Police 
Department for testing. 168  These women sought a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting defendants from refusing to test rape kits.169 
The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee allowed Doe’s 
equal protection claim for sex discrimination under § 1983 to survive a 
motion to dismiss and enter discovery.170 The defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss Doe’s claim, arguing that she failed to allege disparate treatment 
“with a discriminatory purpose or that similarly situated males received more 
favorable treatment.”171 The “or” in this statement may be read to suggest 
that defendants concede that comparators are not the only way to show 
discriminatory purpose. Although the district court stated that the plaintiff 
must plausibly plead that she was treated “disparately as compared to 
similarly situated persons,”172 the court went on to explain that in order to 
allege a valid equal protection claim, plaintiffs must “show that it is the 
policy or custom of [defendant] to provide less protection to victims of 
[sexual assaults] than those of other crimes, and that gender discrimination 
was the motivation for this disparate treatment.”173 Despite no specific or 
particularized pleadings related to comparators, the court proceeded to hold 
that the plaintiff had provided sufficient factual allegations to survive a 
motion to dismiss because she alleged a policy of not testing rape kits, 
“which are almost exclusively used on women.”174 The court inferred intent 
to discriminate based on “the lack of testing, the severe discriminatory effect, 
and the factual allegations that Defendant’s agents were consistently 
untruthful.” 175  The court denied the motion to dismiss as to the equal 
protection claim and did not require the plaintiff to produce specific 
comparators; even though she drew a generalized comparison to victims of 
other crimes, she was not required to produce particular facts about other 
victims who were similarly situated in all respects besides gender.176 
Following the district court ruling, the plaintiffs engaged in discovery 
lasting two years before the district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the city.177 However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and 
 
 168 Id. at 5, 13–14. 
 169 Id. at 29. 
 170 City of Memphis, 2014 WL 11514980, at *5–6. 
 171 Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
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remanded for further discovery, briefly affirming the lower court’s 
implication that specific pleadings concerning comparators were not 
required for the equal protection claim to move forward in the process.178 The 
Sixth Circuit further argued that “[a]bsent direct evidence of discriminatory 
motivation, ‘[a] discriminatory effect which is severe enough can provide 
sufficient evidence’ of such motivation under appropriate circumstances.”179 
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit ruling aligns with the view that a precise 
comparator is not required to establish discriminatory intent at the pleading 
stage when a comparison may be inferred from the totality of the evidence.  
3. Marlowe v. City of San Francisco 
On April 6, 2010, Heather Marlowe was drugged and sexually assaulted 
after participating in San Francisco’s Bay to Breakers race.180 Following the 
race, “Marlowe was handed a beer in a red plastic cup by a male attendee.”181 
After drinking the beer, “Marlowe began feeling much more inebriated than 
would have been normal given her moderate alcohol consumption up to that 
point. Marlowe regained consciousness inside an unfamiliar home 
approximately [eight] hours after she was last seen at Bay to Breakers. 
Marlowe was physically injured, experienced vaginal and pelvic pain, was 
nauseous and vomited several times, was dazed, confused, and had no 
memory of what had occurred in the house.”182 Realizing that she had been 
raped, “Marlowe went to the nearest emergency room” to undergo a sexual 
assault examination conducted by a SANE nurse. 183  The San Francisco 
Police Department (SFPD), which took Marlowe’s report at the hospital, 
indicated that the rape kit would be processed in the next fourteen to sixty 
days.184 
Marlowe later contacted Police Officer Joe Cordes, the SFPD officer 
investigating her allegation, with an indication of who she suspected was the 
man who raped her.185 “Cordes instructed Marlowe to make contact with 
Suspect, and flirt with him in order to elicit a confession that he had indeed 
 
 178 Id. at 493–94, 496, 497. 
 179 Id. at 487 (quoting United States v. Thorpe, 471 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United 
States v. Tuitt, 68 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10 (D. Mass. 1999))). 
 180 Complaint at 2–3, Marlowe v. City of San Francisco, No. 3:16-CV-00076, 2017 WL 5973505 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017), aff’d, 753 F. App’x 479 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct 244 (2019) 
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raped Marlowe. Cordes also instructed Marlowe to set up a date with Suspect 
to prove that Marlowe could identify Suspect in a crowd. Cordes told 
Marlowe that if she refused to engage in [this] action[], SFPD would cease 
its investigation of her rape.”186 Cordes later “strongly discouraged Marlowe 
from further pursuing her case” because it “was too much work for the SFPD 
to investigate and prosecute a rape in which alcohol was involved.”187 After 
repeatedly attempting to set up a “date,” Marlowe contacted Cordes to 
inform him “that she refused to continue to privately investigate her case.”188 
Only then did SFPD inform Marlowe that the suspect had been taken in for 
questioning and his DNA sample collected.189 Marlowe was told that the 
suspect’s DNA was being processed at the lab and that her rape kit results 
would be available shortly.190 
Over the course of the next two years, Marlowe unsuccessfully sought 
testing of her rape kit.191 She was told that there was a “backlog” at the lab 
because of the priority to test evidence from “more important” crimes.192 At 
one point, “Marlowe was told that due to the passage of time, her case was 
considered ‘inactive’ and was placed in a storage facility. SFPD also told 
Marlowe that because she was ‘a woman,’ ‘weighs less than men,’ and has 
her ‘menstruations,’ that Marlowe should not have been out partying” on the 
day of the incident.193 Marlowe eventually discovered that her experience 
was not unusual.194 In 2014, after first denying the existence of a backlog, 
SFPD acknowledged that “several thousand” rape kits dating back to 2003 
remained untested.195 
4. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis 
Similar to Doe, Heather Marlowe’s experience illustrates the 
deficiencies of police responses to reports of rape and sexual assault. 
Although her exact circumstances are unique, police inaction unfortunately 
is not. In 2016, Marlowe sued the city of San Francisco, along with various 
top police officials, alleging a violation of equal protection and seeking to 
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compel San Francisco to test her rape kit.196 The complaint charged that the 
police department “had the policy, practice and/or custom of failing to 
diligently investigate sexual assault allegations,” as evidenced by its failure 
to test thousands of rape kits.197 
Despite the clear disregard the police showed Marlowe in their 
investigation of her sexual assault, the District Court for the Northern District 
of California dismissed Marlowe’s case on two grounds: Marlowe “fail[ed] 
to allege any facts to . . . support a determination that similarly situated 
persons were treated more favorably than Marlowe,” and her claim was 
barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.198 The district court 
stated that in order to allege a valid equal protection claim, Marlowe would 
need to show “facts to support [her] conclusory allegations that defendants 
treat persons who report sexual assaults less favorably than persons who are 
similarly situated.”199  The defendants argued that the proper comparison 
group would be male rape victims whose rape kits were treated differently.200 
Conversely, Marlowe alleged a difference in treatment between sexual 
assault victims and victims of other crimes without specific pleadings 
pertaining to comparators. 201  Part of her theory of discriminatory intent 
rested on the statement by police that other crimes were “more important” 
and therefore merited a higher priority for DNA testing.202 
Nonetheless, the district court held that Marlowe failed to allege any 
facts to substantiate that persons who reported other types of crimes were 
treated more favorably and dismissed her claim.203 The district court further 
held that Marlowe was not eligible for an exception to the statute of 
limitations.204 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal in a 
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 203 Marlowe, 2017 WL 5973505, at *1–2. 
 204 Id. at *2. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1808 
brief memorandum. 205  Although the Ninth Circuit did not describe the 
contours of the comparator requirement,206 the lower court only listed two 
grounds for dismissal—the statute of limitations and comparators.207 After 
briefly dispensing with the statute of limitations, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
Marlowe’s claims were conclusory and “fail[ed] on the merits.” 208  The 
dismissal on the merits hinged on the lack of specific pleadings pertaining to 
comparators; therefore, by affirming, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
comparator standard. In reaching its conclusion, the lower court quoted an 
earlier Ninth Circuit opinion which held that an “equal protection claim 
requires a showing of ‘unequal treatment of people in similar 
circumstances,’”209 which further establishes that the Ninth Circuit adheres 
to the comparator requirement and will not infer discriminatory intent from 
the totality of the evidence. 
On July 22, 2019, Marlowe petitioned the Supreme Court to hear her 
case.210 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 7, 2019.211 In her 
petition for certiorari, Marlowe argued that not testing rape kits was a 
symptom of “underenforcement of rape complaints—90[%] of which are 
brought by women”—and that public policy supported enabling valid equal 
protection claims on those grounds.212 She further argued that the Supreme 
Court needed to step in because of the differences between the Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis and the Ninth Circuit’s approach under incredibly similar facts.213 
To this day, she has not received the results from her rape kit, despite the San 
Francisco Police Department alleging that it has cleared its rape kit 
backlog.214 
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C. Circuit Court Comparison 
While these circuits relied on the same rule in theory, they diverged in 
application, which ultimately resulted in disparate pleading standards. While 
in the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff would need to plead specific facts pertaining 
to a comparator to survive a motion to dismiss,215 a plaintiff in the Sixth 
Circuit would not.216 More specifically, the Sixth Circuit permitted a finding 
of intent that rested on the totality of the circumstances, including the 
pervasive lack of testing that disproportionately impacted women and 
specific untruthful statements made by the defendants, thus not requiring 
specific facts pertaining to a comparator.217 On the other hand, the Ninth 
Circuit sought specific facts of persons who are similarly situated to the 
plaintiff, or comparators, who did not face the same denial of police 
protective services in order to find discriminatory intent.218 Marlowe, the 
Ninth Circuit plaintiff, pleaded specific facts showing that the SFPD had a 
longstanding practice of deprioritizing and refusing to properly investigate 
rape complaints, even outsourcing the investigations to the victims 
themselves, shelving thousands of rape kits for years, lying about the 
quantity of untested kits, and actively discouraging rape victims from 
pursuing cases.219 Under the Sixth Circuit standard, these facts would appear 
more than sufficient to establish a prima facie pleading of discriminatory 
intent. The Court must clarify the proper pleading standard in order to ensure 
fairness and uniformity of law.220 Jurisdiction alone should not determine 
whether a plaintiff receives justice. 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Marlowe,221 the Court 
should accept certiorari in a future case in order to clarify the appropriate 
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standard for similar equal protection cases. There are multiple pending 
lawsuits in other circuits alleging equal protection violations based on similar 
facts,222 and likely even more suits have yet to be filed. As these lawsuits 
continue, courts should follow the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that to state a prima 
facie equal protection claim, plaintiffs must show that the defendants 
engaged in a custom or practice to provide less protection to victims of 
sexual assaults than other crimes and that this was motivated by gender 
discrimination.223 At the pleading stage, discrimination can be inferred based 
on the totality of the circumstances; this standard does not require a threshold 
pleading of specific comparators.224  
 Besides the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, plaintiffs in 
similar cases are very likely to satisfy the other elements of a successful equal 
protection claim, including proving that the constitutional denial resulted 
from state action and that the lack of testing did not advance a legitimate 
government interest. This Part will analyze and apply the requirements of an 
equal protection claim brought under § 1983 in order to illustrate how 
requiring specific comparators to show discriminatory intent hinders 
effective equal protection litigation. This Part ultimately argues that the Sixth 
Circuit correctly held that specific pleadings pertaining to comparators are 
not necessary to establish discrimination and that the Supreme Court should 
adopt this standard in a future case. 
A. Discrimination Without Comparators 
The Sixth Circuit standard to not require pleading specific facts related 
to comparators is built on a foundation of other circuit courts’ holdings in 
related cases, illustrating that plaintiffs can demonstrate a legally sufficient 
equal protection claim without the need for comparators. In Watson v. City 
of Kansas City, the Tenth Circuit considered a claim brought by a woman 
alleging an equal protection violation due to police refusal to respond to her 
reports of domestic violence. 225  The court held that in order to survive 
summary judgment, she must “demonstrate that it is the policy or custom of 
the defendants to provide less police protection to victims of domestic assault 
than to other assault victims, . . . provide evidence that discrimination was a 
motivating factor for the defendants,” and show “that she was injured by 
operation of the policy or custom.”226 Although the court relied in part on 
 
 222  See Borkowski v. Baltimore County, 414 F. Supp. 3d 788, 797–800 (D. Md. 2019); Smith 
Complaint, supra note 13, at 1–2. 
 223 See Doe v. City of Memphis, 928 F.3d 481, 487 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 224 Id. at 493. 
 225 857 F.2d 690, 692–93 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 226 Id. at 694. 
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statistical evidence that nondomestic assault cases were more likely to lead 
to an arrest than domestic assault cases in order to show discriminatory 
impact, the court did not require specific facts pertaining to individual assault 
victims who were similarly situated to domestic violence victims. 227 
Following the ruling of the Tenth Circuit, at least six other circuits have 
adopted the Watson standard for equal protection claims brought by victims 
of domestic violence. 228  These holdings establish that various types of 
evidence, such as anecdotal or statistical evidence, can be sufficient to show 
discriminatory intent, thereby clearly negating the requirement to plead 
specific facts relating to a comparator. 229  When adopting the Watson 
standard, the Fifth Circuit noted that “the standard articulated 
in Watson represents a coherent approach for courts to review Equal 
Protection claims pertaining to law enforcement’s practices, policies, and 
customs toward domestic assault cases.” 230  The Fifth Circuit opinion is 
 
 227 Id. at 695–96 (“[The plaintiff] presented evidence showing that out of 608 nondomestic assault 
cases in Kansas City, Kansas, from January 1, 1983, to September 8, 1983, where there was a known 
perpetrator, there were 186 arrests for an arrest rate of 31%. Out of 369 domestic assaults, there were only 
69 arrests for a rate of 16%.”). 
 228 Jones v. Union County, 296 F.3d 417, 426 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Plaintiff must show that it is the 
policy or custom . . . to provide less protection to victims of domestic violence than those of other crimes, 
and that gender discrimination was the motivation for this disparate treatment.”); Shipp v. McMahon, 
234 F.3d 907, 914 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]oday we join the circuits that have adopted Watson’s approach.”); 
Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1066 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Under the standard we adopt today, Soto must show 
that there is a policy or custom of providing less protection to victims of domestic assault than to victims 
of other crimes, that gender discrimination is a motivating factor, and that Soto was injured by the 
practice.”); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that plaintiff must adduce 
“evidence sufficient to sustain the inference that there is a policy or a practice of affording less protection 
to victims of domestic violence than to other victims of violence in comparable circumstances, that 
discrimination against one sex was a motivating factor, and that the policy or practice was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff’s injury”); Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the 
Watson standard to an equal protection claim against a municipality); Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 
1026, 1031 (3rd Cir. 1988) (noting that in order to survive summary judgment on an equal protection 
claim, “a plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that it is 
the policy or custom of the police to provide less protection to victims of domestic violence than to other 
victims of violence, that discrimination against women was a motivating factor, and that the plaintiff was 
injured by the policy or custom”). 
 229 See Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 782 (implying that discriminatory intent could be established by evidence 
of statistics or remarks by defendants yet finding plaintiff’s evidence insufficient); Balistreri v. Pacifica 
Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701–02 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that officer remarks that plaintiff’s husband 
was entitled to hit her because she was “carrying on” suggested “an intention to treat domestic abuse 
cases less seriously than other assaults, as well as an animus against abused women” sufficient to allow 
plaintiff’s complaint to survive motion to dismiss); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 
1530 (D. Conn. 1984) (denying a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim based on a series of acts 
and omissions on the part of the defendant police officers showing deliberate indifference to domestic 
violence complaints). 
 230 Shipp, 234 F.3d at 914. 
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significant because while the other circuits do not explicitly address the 
exclusion of similarly situated comparators, the Fifth Circuit holds that 
similarly situated individuals are still necessary in “class of one” causes of 
action.231 To state a class-of-one equal protection claim, a single plaintiff 
must allege that a similarly situated individual was treated more favorably 
for no rational purpose.232 Lower courts citing to the Fifth Circuit decision 
specifically mention its reference to comparators in class-of-one cases.233 By 
mentioning comparators in class-of-one claims but not in claims based on 
membership in a protected class, the Fifth Circuit suggests that courts do not 
require similarly situated comparators under the Watson standard. This 
opinion establishes that there is no linguistic ambiguity—the courts do not 
require comparators under the Watson standard. 
The Second Circuit has also adopted the Watson standard. 234 
Additionally, the Second Circuit has taken the standard further by 
affirmatively stating that there is no need for comparators in equal protection 
claims based on a facially neutral custom or practice that was motivated by 
discriminatory animus. In Pyke v. Cuomo, the Second Circuit held that when 
plaintiffs “alleg[e] an equal protection claim under a theory of 
discriminatory . . . motivation underlying a facially neutral [custom or 
practice, they] need not plead or show the disparate treatment of other 
similarly situated individuals.” 235  The Second Circuit relied on Supreme 
Court reasoning to argue that while selective-prosecution equal protection 
claims must plead and establish similarly situated comparators due to the 
need for special deference to the Executive Branch in prosecution, no such 
requirement applies to refusal to provide police protection. 236  The court 
expressly held that “[s]o long as [plaintiffs] allege and establish that the 
defendants discriminatorily refused to provide police protection because [of 
the plaintiffs’ membership in a protected class,] plaintiffs need not allege or 
establish the disparate treatment of otherwise similarly situated” 
comparators.237 
 
 231 Id. at 916 (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)) (noting that “the Equal 
Protection Clause can give rise to a cause of action on behalf of a ‘class of one’ even when the plaintiff 
does not allege membership in a protected class or group”). 
 232 Id. 
 233 See, e.g., Lefebure v. Boeker, 390 F. Supp. 3d 729, 762 (M.D. La. 2019). 
 234 Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 235 258 F.3d 107, 108–09 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 236 Id. at 109 (distinguishing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)). 
 237 Id. 
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Part of the court’s reasoning was that it “would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to find” comparators. 238  In Pyke, the plaintiffs were Native 
Americans living on a reservation who were allegedly denied adequate 
police protections.239 Since the plaintiffs’ living arrangement and governance 
were unique to the Native American community, the plaintiffs would be 
incapable of finding similarly situated non-Native American individuals who 
were treated differently.240 If the court enforced a need for comparators in 
order to make a successful equal protection claim, and comparators were 
impossible to find, the police “could lawfully ignore the needs of Native 
Americans for police protection on the basis of discriminatory . . . 
animus.”241 This would enable discrimination without any possible remedy. 
The Second Circuit held that “[t]his is clearly not the law.”242 
Similarly, although plaintiffs may be able to draw a generalized 
comparison to victims of other crimes, it could be difficult or impossible to 
find an exact comparator in cases of rape due to the unique circumstances. 
Courts typically construe the “similarly situated” requirement narrowly, so 
while some differences seem minimal on the surface, more often than not 
they disqualify potential comparators.243 For example, although other crimes 
do result in DNA evidence, such evidence is not necessarily collected or 
handled in the same manner as rape kits, which could disqualify 
comparators.244 Additionally, comparators could be difficult or impossible to 
find because although the vast majority of rape claims are brought by 
women, even the claims brought by men are disbelieved and disregarded, 
albeit for distinct reasons. 245  Many police departments have a culture of 
“hegemonic masculinity,” which leads to bias rooted in sexist stereotypes 
 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 108, 110. 
 240 Id. at 109. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
 243 See Goldberg, supra note 26, at 751–64 (noting that some courts require comparators to be “nearly 
identical”); see, e.g., Ryan v. City of Detroit, 698 F. App’x 272, 277, 279–80 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that 
a victim of domestic violence who was murdered by her ex-husband who was a police officer was not 
similarly situated enough to other female victims of domestic violence that were murdered by police 
officers merely because she did not give her name to the detective when she first reported the domestic 
violence so he did not know her identity). 
 244 For example, for many crimes the DNA evidence is often collected from the crime scene itself 
and is not stored in a uniform “kit.” See JOSEPH PETERSON, IRA SOMMERS, DEBORAH BASKIN & DONALD 
JOHNSON, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PROCESS 90, 93 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5P7S-2P2R]. 
 245 Yung, supra note 48, at 230 (only 48% of police officers in one survey “said they would believe 
a male victim”). 
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against not only female victims but male victims of rape as well. 246 
Accordingly, officers may believe that men cannot really be raped and thus 
dispose of cases accordingly.247 Unfortunately, this not only prevents male 
rape victims from obtaining justice but also disqualifies them as a useful 
comparator class, despite the fact that they are the most similarly situated to 
female victims of sexual violence yet fall outside the protected class. This is 
similar to the problem of the “‘equal opportunity’ harasser” in employment-
based sex-discrimination claims; in cases when an employer harasses both 
men and women, courts have found that this is not discrimination “because 
of sex” and thus the employees are left without a remedy despite suffering 
from sexual harassment. 248  From the reasoning of Pyke, enforcing a 
comparator standard for equal protection claims based on untested rape kits 
would be contrary to law and policy because it would enable police to 
“lawfully ignore the need of [women] for police protection on the basis of 
discriminatory . . . animus.” 249  If there is no comparator that would be 
similarly situated enough for the courts to hear a claim, then police can 
effectively ignore the needs of victims of sexual assault with impunity. 
Furthermore, the comparator requirement belies the reality of 
intersectional identities. Intersectionality theory recognizes that people are 
often subject to unequal treatment based on “their identity as a whole, [not] 
individual traits in isolation.” 250  Race, poverty, and sexual violence are 
inextricably linked.251 As a result, it can be difficult to determine the exact 
 
 246 Namian, supra note 82, at 100, 103–15. 
 247 Id. at 100. 
 248 See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Title VII does not cover the 
‘equal opportunity’ or ‘bisexual’ harasser, then, because such a person is not discriminating on the basis 
of sex. He is not treating one sex better (or worse) than the other; he is treating both sexes the same (albeit 
badly).”). 
 249 See Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 250 Goldberg, supra note 26, at 736. Professor Suzanne Goldberg explains that the “theory emerged 
in legal scholarship in the early 1990s,” id. at 736 n.20, pioneered by scholars who argued that “the 
experiences of women of color are frequently the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, 
and . . . tend not to be represented within the discourses of either feminism or antiracism,” Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (1991) (footnote omitted), and who “characteriz[ed] and 
criticiz[ed] ‘gender essentialism—the notion that a unitary, “essential” women’s experience can be 
isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience,’” 
Goldberg, supra note 26, at 736 n.20 (quoting Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990)).  
 251 See Thema Bryant-Davis, Sarah E. Ullman, Yuying Tsong, Shaquita Tillman & Kimberly Smith, 
Struggling to Survive: Sexual Assault, Poverty, and Mental Health Outcomes of African American 
Women, 80 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 61, 61 (2010) (noting Black women’s “increased risk for sexual 
assault and . . . persistent poverty”). See generally EMILY AUSTIN & LORENA CAMPOS, CAL. COAL. 
AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT, ENDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: AN INTERSECTIONAL APPROACH (2017), 
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reason why a victim’s rape complaint is mishandled—it could be her gender, 
her race, her socioeconomic status, her sexual orientation, her employment 
(e.g., as a sex worker), or, most likely, some combination of these traits. 
Although this Note centers its discussion on equal protection claims based 
on gender, with the widespread and increasing recognition of police bias 
against the Black community,252 it would be remiss to fail to acknowledge 
how comparators particularly fail women of color. A Black woman who is 
neglected by police after a rape may have a harder time proving an equal 
protection claim because it would be unclear which aspect of her identity 
triggered the nonresponse and who the appropriate comparator should be.253  
Professor Suzanne B. Goldberg has identified the incompatibility of 
intersectionality as one of the key issues with comparator requirements.254 
Although some courts have attempted to address this by considering “a 
limited idea of ‘sex plus’ or ‘race plus’ discrimination,” each must be proven 
individually, which fails to consider how various forms of discrimination 
coincide. 255  Professor Shreya Atrey has also discussed the problem of 
comparators in effectively addressing intersectionality, further pointing out 
that comparators inherently create a binary that is antithetical to modern 
conceptions of identity: “So if a disabled Black woman brings a 
discrimination claim on the basis of her disability, race, and gender, who 
would her comparator(s) be? . . . Could we also consider comparators 
beyond the trite binaries of disabled/non-disabled, white/Black, women/men 
to see comparator groups more closely based on their nature of disabilities, 
ethnicities, and genders?” 256  Courts accepting evidence other than 
 
https://www.calcasa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/SAAM-2017-reduced-size-edited.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E75W-WZ9K] (describing how sexual violence overlaps with other systems of 
oppression, including racial and economic justice); Crenshaw, supra note 250, at 1243. 
 252 See, e.g., Mary-Elizabeth Murphy, Black Women Are the Victims of Police Violence, Too, WASH. 
POST (July 24, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/24/police-violence-
happens-against-women-too [https://perma.cc/88S4-LMCU] (noting a history of gendered police 
violence and how “white police officers seem[] to relish the opportunity to assert racial and sexual 
dominance over black women”); see also Policing Women: Race and Gender Disparities in Police Stops, 
Searches, and Use of Force, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/05/14/policingwomen [https://perma.cc/69KR-HS9A] 
(observing that “women make up an increasingly large share of all arrests,” with Black women more 
likely to be subjected to arrests and use of force than white or Latina women). 
 253 Goldberg, supra note 26, at 764–66, 772–77 (“Because all individuals have multidimensional 
aspects of their identities, as current iterations of intersectionality theory show, very close comparators 
are hard to come by even for a relatively simple discrimination claim.”). 
 254 Id. 
 255 Shreya Atrey, Comparison in Intersectional Discrimination, 38 LEGAL STUD. 379, 381 (2018). 
 256 Id. at 380–81; see also Ben Smith, Intersectional Discrimination and Substantive Equality: A 
Comparative and Theoretical Perspective, 16 EQUAL RTS. REV. 73, 81 (2016) (noting that discrimination 
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comparators to prove discriminatory intent would help alleviate this 
problem. 
Without comparators, “plaintiffs must still allege facts supporting a 
plausible inference that ‘discriminatory intent was a motivating factor’ in 
order to state an equal protection claim.”257 Under this standard, plaintiffs 
could “show discriminatory intent by pointing to animus on the part of 
individual officers . . . or a pattern of failing to provide an adequate police 
response to a protected class.”258 Intent can be inferred (like in Doe v. City of 
Memphis) from evidence that police generally fail to respond adequately to 
victims of sexual assault as opposed to the victims of other violent crimes, 
even if there are not specific individuals similarly situated enough to be 
considered comparators by the court.259 For example, plaintiffs could allege 
that DNA evidence from other crimes was statistically more likely to be 
tested than the DNA evidence contained in rape kits. 
Plaintiffs could also use specific facts to show explicit evidence of 
discriminatory animus, such as evidence from police reports and statements 
by police that they do not believe victims of sexual assault. In Chase v. 
Nodine’s Smokehouse, the court followed the Second Circuit ruling in Pyke 
in holding that the “[p]laintiff need not plead disparate treatment of similarly 
situated individuals” but rather “must allege facts supporting a plausible 
inference that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor behind the denial 
of police protection.”260 Discriminatory intent could be found by “evidence 
of animus on the part of individual officers, including pointing to demeanor 
and specific statements.” 261  In Chase, the police allegedly mocked the 
victim’s complaint of sexual assault and harassment by “recharacterizing 
[her] allegations . . . as ‘flirting.’”262 During an interview with the defendant, 
the investigating officer exhibited “disdain for the case by saying he knew 
[the defendant] was not a ‘menace to society’ and that there was no need to 
 
jurisprudence often “essentialize[s] the experiences of identity groups,” meaning “the law assumes 
individuals can be characterized by one dominant ground, leaving those with complex identities outside 
the scope of protection”). 
 257 White v. City of New York, 206 F. Supp. 3d 920, 930–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Okin v. Vill. 
of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 438 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also Okin, 577 F.3d at 439 
(holding that a victim of domestic violence making an equal protection claim need not necessarily allege 
similarly situated comparators but is still required “to show that it was her gender, and not some other 
characteristic, that motivated the treatment she received”). 
 258 White, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 930–31. 
 259 See Doe v. City of Memphis, 928 F.3d 481, 493 (6th Cir. 2019).  
 260 No. 3:18-CV-00683, 2019 WL 1469412, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 3, 2019) (citing Pyke v. Cuomo, 
258 F.3d 107, 108–09 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 261 Id. (citing White, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 932). 
 262 Id. 
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‘track down every lead.’”263 The officer also “set out a plan to ‘turn the 
tables’ on [the plaintiff] and bragged about flipping a prior sexual assault 
case on the victim by bringing a false statement case against her.”264  
Heather Marlowe similarly pled evidence of specific statements by the 
police to establish discriminatory animus. An officer said to Marlowe that if 
she refused to flirt with and set up a date with the defendant, the “SFPD 
would cease its investigation of her rape.” 265  The officer “strongly 
discouraged Marlowe from further pursuing her case, indicating that it was 
too much work for the SFPD to investigate and prosecute a rape in which 
alcohol was involved.”266 Instead of thoroughly investigating, the officers 
blamed Marlowe and told her “that because she was ‘a woman,’ [who] 
‘weighs less than men[]’ and has her ‘menstruations,’ that [she] should not 
have been out partying” on the day of the incident.267 Like in Chase, these 
facts should be sufficient to make a showing of discriminatory intent 
regardless of comparators. 
B. State Action 
In addition to establishing discrimination, in order to bring a claim 
against police, a plaintiff would need to meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. Section 1983 was passed shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment in 
order to provide a remedy for victims whose federal or constitutional rights 
have been violated by an actor proceeding under state authority.268 Section 
1983 imposes liability on a state actor who deprives a person “of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.”269 In order to state a 
claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts that satisfy two 
requirements: first, that there was a “violation of a right secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States,” and second, “that the alleged 
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”270 
 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Marlowe Complaint,  supra note 180, at 4. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. at 5. 
 268 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978) (“[A]ny person who, under color of 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be 
subjected, any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of 
the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983)). 
 269 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 270 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 
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The refusal to test rapes kits en masse, as seen in Marlowe, violates the 
right to equal protection “secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”271 Following the Court’s holding in Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, municipal entities may be liable under § 1983 when their policies, 
customs, or practices cause a constitutional deprivation. 272  Police 
departments and the cities they serve can both be held liable under this 
standard.273 In order to establish a custom, the custom must be “founded upon 
practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct 
has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.”274 The Ninth Circuit 
has held that a dozen cases of denying medical treatment was sufficient to 
constitute a custom or practice.275 Therefore, the refusal to test thousands of 
rape kits in Marlowe should pass this threshold to establish a custom or 
practice by state actors—police officers—denying equal protection of 
services under color of state law.276 
Police officers are indisputably actors proceeding under state 
authority.277 The denial of police protective services has been held to be 
sufficient to make an equal protection claim under § 1983. In fact, the 
selective withdrawal of police protection is the “prototypical denial of equal 
protection,” such as when the Reconstruction Era Southern states refused 
police protection to Black citizens.278 Although “there is no constitutional 
right . . . to be protected against being attacked or raped by a member of the 
general public,” if “the state discriminates in providing [its] protection to 
members of the public[,] those situations ‘of course violate the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’”279 Police officers have a 
 
 271 See id. 
 272 436 U.S. 658, 707–08 (1978). 
 273 See id. at 701. 
 274 Oyenik v. Corizon Health Inc., 696 F. App’x 792, 794 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Trevino v. Gates, 
99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996), holding modified by Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 275 Id. at 794–95. While Oyenik found a “custom or practice of deliberate indifference to prisoners’ 
serious medical needs,” the case may also provide guidance for establishing a custom or practice in the 
equal protection context. See id.  
 276 Heather Marlowe Files Sexual Assault Case to Supreme Court, S.F. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2019), 
http://www.thesfnews.com/sf-woman-files-sexual-assault-case-to-supreme-court/50028 
[https://perma.cc/X2XD-E7PF] (“SFPD’s own internal audit [revealed] they only tested ‘753 of the 
several thousand untested rape kits’ in 2014.”). 
 277 Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that police officers 
did not contest that their actions occurred under color of state law); Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal 
Dep’t, 864 F.2d 1026, 1029 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding “no dispute that the police officers were acting under 
color of state law”). 
 278 Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 279 Lowers v. City of Streator, 627 F. Supp. 244, 246 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (quoting Bowers v. De Vito, 
686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)); see also Watson, 857 F.2d at 694 (“[F]ailing to provide police 
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duty to protect people in their city and “must do so on a fair and equal 
basis.”280 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 
the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he State may not . . . selectively deny its 
protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the 
Equal Protection Clause.”281 Multiple courts have further acknowledged that 
this reasoning can specifically apply to intentionally discriminatory policies, 
practices, and customs of law enforcement with regard to domestic violence 
and sexual assault cases. 282  In the past few decades, there has been a 
“growing trend” of § 1983 claims against the police alleging violations of 
equal protection for female domestic violence and sexual assault victims.283 
Valid equal protection claims have even been substantiated when police 
departments have failed to properly collect and test rape kits. 284  Police 
officers often have sole discretion concerning whether to submit rape kits for 
testing.285 Therefore, by refusing to test rape kits, they are exerting their state 
authority to deny equal protection of their services and leave victims without 
any possible recourse for redress. 
Thus, lawsuits that allege equal protection violations for police refusal 
to test rape kits meet the necessary components of sufficient state action for 
a successful § 1983 equal protection claim. 
 
protection is subject to the equal protection clause under section 1983. . . . Although there is no general 
constitutional right to police protection, the state may not discriminate in providing such protection.”); 
Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618 (“Discrimination in providing protection against private violence could of course 
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 36–37 
(6th Cir. 1973) (“[A] law enforcement officer can be liable under § 1983 when by his inaction he fails to 
perform a statutorily imposed duty to enforce the laws equally and fairly, and thereby denies equal 
protection to persons legitimately exercising rights guaranteed them under state or federal law.”); 
Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574, 577 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (“[I]f officials have notice of 
the possibility of attacks on women in domestic relationships or other persons, they are under an 
affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect the personal safety of such persons in the 
community. Failure to perform this duty would constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws.” 
(quoting Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984))).  
 280 Bartalone, 643 F. Supp. at 576–77. 
 281 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989). 
 282 Lefebure v. Boeker, 390 F. Supp. 3d 729, 746–48 (M.D. La. 2019) (holding the plaintiff alleged 
a valid equal protection claim based on the failure of city officials to investigate her rape and test her rape 
kit); Chase v. Nodine’s Smokehouse, Inc., No. 3:18-CV-00683, 2019 WL 1469412, at *3 (D. Conn. Apr. 
3, 2019) (noting that “the police may not choose to shirk their duty to pursue a criminal sexual assault 
complaint because of some animus against women who make such claims”); Lowers, 627 F. Supp. at 246 
(holding a § 1983 claim was sufficiently stated when the plaintiff alleged that the police failure to 
investigate and arrest her rapist “was a result of her being a woman”). 
 283 Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep’t, 864 F.2d 1026, 1027 (3d Cir. 1988); see sources cited 
supra note 282. 
 284 Lefebure, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 762–63; Consent Judgment, supra note 115, at 1.  
 285 See Fucci, supra note 41, at 204.  
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C. Intermediate Scrutiny 
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie equal protection claim based 
on state action under § 1983 and discriminatory intent, the courts will assess 
gender-based equal protection claims under an intermediate scrutiny 
standard. This standard means that gender distinctions must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives in order to be considered constitutional.286 
Although no case alleging these specific facts has come before the 
Supreme Court yet, police refusal to test rape kits would likely not survive 
intermediate scrutiny. There is no important government objective served by 
failing to test rape kits. In fact, not testing rape kits is anathema to the 
important government interests of public safety and public trust in the 
government. In Craig v. Boren, the Court stated that “the protection of public 
health and safety” clearly represents an important government objective.287 
Testing rape kits would only serve to enhance public safety by identifying 
offenders and bringing them to justice. 
Defendants may argue that not testing rape kits serves the important 
government objectives of efficiency and saving money; however, the Court 
held in Frontiero v. Richardson that these are not compelling government 
interests. 288  Regardless, not testing rape kits would not be substantially 
related to the achievement of those objectives. There are already federal 
funds granted to states for testing rape kits, so refusing to test rape kits does 
not save the state money.289 One study even shows that testing all backlogged 
sexual assault kits is actually more cost effective as it averts future sexual 
assaults that will ultimately cost more money.290  
Additionally, as more rape kits are tested, the CODIS database grows, 
which enhances the ability of law enforcement to find perpetrators of all 
 
 286 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that a state’s lower drinking age for women 
than for men does not survive intermediate scrutiny). 
 287 Id. at 199–200. 
 288 See 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (“[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and 
efficiency.” (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972))). In Frontiero, the Court held a statute 
that enabled female spouses of members of the military to receive dependent benefits but prevented male 
spouses of female service members from receiving dependent benefits violated the equal protection 
requirement under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 690–91. The Court, using a strict scrutiny standard, stated 
that administrative convenience was not a justifiable reason for this discrimination. Id. at 690. 
 289 See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text; see also Jackman, supra note 46 (noting that the 
current Act authorizes “the Justice Department to spend up to $151 million in grants to states and localities 
for costs associated with testing DNA evidence”).  
 290 Can Wang & Lawrence M. Wein, Analyzing Approaches to the Backlog of Untested Sexual 
Assault Kits in the U.S.A., 63 J. FORENSIC SCIS. 1110, 1117 (2018) (explaining that “spending $1,641 to 
test [a rape kit] averts $133,484 in future [sexual assault]-related costs on average”). 
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crimes, not just rapes.291 This would actually improve efficiency because 
instead of multiple officers running parallel investigations on the same 
suspect, having a robust system of DNA could help link crimes committed 
by one perpetrator.292 Therefore, it is likely that police arguments defending 
their refusal to test rape kits would not survive intermediate scrutiny. 
This analysis makes clear that proving intent to discriminate is the main 
barrier to successful equal protections claims. 
D. The Future of Rape Kit Litigation 
This Note attempts to fill the gap in scholarly engagement around equal 
protection claims in the hopes that courts will realize the problems with the 
comparator requirement and adjust discrimination standards accordingly. 
While equal protection claims are not the only option for eliminating the rape 
kit backlog, they represent a promising and increasing area of litigation that 
has yet to be explored by professors and academics. There is a paucity of 
scholarship regarding rape kit equal protection claims. Lawsuits alleging 
equal protection violations based on the failure to test rape kits are relatively 
new—all have occurred within the last few years.293 While student-written 
scholarship has extensively documented issues with the rape kit backlog,294 
there has been little attention given specifically to equal protection cases. 
Thus, there is limited academic foundation to ground an analysis for potential 
plaintiffs. 
Although other authors have proposed efforts to tackle the backlog, 
these options likely lack popular support as well as effective enforcement 
mechanisms. In her note, Glenne Ellen Fucci proposes legislative efforts to 
tackle the rape kit backlog, such as state legislation that makes testing 
mandatory and requires a timeline for compliance.295 She outlines the various 
legislative efforts already taken by some state and local governments to 
address the backlog: inventory bills to determine the size of the backlog; 
future testing bills to mandate testing of incoming rape kits; comprehensive 
testing bills to both test future rape kits and clear the existing backlog; and 
survivor bills that grant victims rights to certain information regarding their 
 
 291 Jackman, supra note 46 (“[CODIS] has produced more than 475,000 matches, solving crimes 
across the spectrum from murder to rape to burglary to vandalism.”). 
 292 See id. 
 293 See sources cited supra note 13. 
 294 Fucci, supra note 41, at 196–201; Fulton, supra note 6, at 44–51; Hansen, supra note 22, at 943–
949. Scholarship from professors and academics is, unfortunately, lacking in this area. 
 295 Fucci, supra note 41, at 220. 
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rape kits.296 Despite the effectiveness of some of this legislation, few states 
have enacted such policies.297 Unfortunately, the comprehensive bills, which 
are particularly effective, have only been implemented in four states.298 Fucci 
argues that politicians and local leadership must take action to allocate 
funding for testing, remove police discretion by mandating testing, enforce 
timelines to clear backlogs, and “ensure that no new backlog[s] develop.”299 
However, the question remains: how do we get them to do so? 
Stephanie Fulton has similarly argued that increased funding coupled 
with mandatory testing laws would remedy the issue. 300  However, given 
police departments’ widespread failure to make effective use of federal 
funding and the difficulty of providing legislative oversight, it is tough to 
imagine successful implementation of these measures without some type of 
enforcement mechanism. Fulton proposes that noncompliance could be 
penalized by withholding funds for grants or other programs; however, this 
presumes that legislation would be passed initially.301 Although some states 
have made progress in this direction, 302  mandatory-testing laws often 
promise prospective relief for future victims without systems in place to 
ensure that testing actually occurs. For example, Illinois passed a bill in 2017 
to create a rape kit tracking system, but the system is still not fully operative, 
and not all hospitals are participating, which limits its effectiveness. 303 
Notably, the federal government passed the DNA Analysis Backlog 
Elimination Act in 2000, 304  yet the backlog persists. Over the years, 
legislative efforts to combat sexual violence have been slow and fraught with 
resistance.305 Thus, it is difficult to imagine that mandatory-testing laws will 
yield different results without an enforcement mechanism. 
 
 296 Id. at 208–17. 
 297 Id. at 208–09. 
 298 Id. at 213. 
 299 Id. at 227. 
 300 Fulton, supra note 6, at 67–68. 
 301 See id. at 70. 
 302 Starting 2019 Off Strong: 28 Rape Kit Reform Bills in 19 States, END THE BACKLOG (2019), 
http://www.endthebacklog.org/blog/starting-2019-strong-28-rape-kit-reform-bills-19-states 
[https://perma.cc/NT6G-THYZ]. 
 303 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 202/50 (2017); Alison Bowen, Illinois Launches Online System to Track 
Rape Kits in New Cases. But Not Every Hospital Is on Board., CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 23, 2020, 11:49 AM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/living/health/ct-life-rape-kit-online-tracking-system-illinois-tt-
20200923-svmwwxdedvdgdkjtxn2cuatsfa-story.html [https://perma.cc/4CY5-Q72X].  
 304 O’Connor, supra note 103, at 207. 
 305  See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 17–44 (1998) (describing the legal history of rape and why the states have failed to 
meaningfully reform rape laws). 
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An equal protection claim would provide that enforcement mechanism. 
Fulton acknowledges that “agencies that do not comply with [mandatory-
testing laws] must be penalized.”306 But her proposed solution—decreasing 
funding for other agency programs 307 —appears unworkable; decreased 
funding for police departments will likely not gain the popular support 
needed to be implemented.308 Further, without investing the diverted funds 
into alternative community-based strategies, policing may only become 
more problematic as police deprioritize funding from the very initiatives 
advocates want them to expand.309 
While mandating and funding rape kit testing could address part of the 
greater problem, it fails to address the root of the systemic police bias that 
prevents women from bringing their cases forward to begin with.310 Studies 
show that sexual misconduct is the “second most common complaint against 
[police] officers,” with an officer being accused of sexual misconduct “at 
least once every five days in the [United States].”311 If the very same police 
that are charged with serving and protecting survivors of sexual violence are 
the ones perpetrating sexual violence, there needs to be a higher mechanism 
that holds police departments accountable. If courts—and particularly the 
Supreme Court—take a stand in favor of providing protection for victims of 
sexual assault, that would signal to police departments that they must take 
 
 306 Fulton, supra note 6, at 70. 
 307 Id. 
 308 See Scott Neuman, Police Viewed Less Favorably, but Few Want to ‘Defund’ Them, Survey 
Finds, NPR (July 9, 2020, 10:55 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-
justice/2020/07/09/889618702/police-viewed-less-favorably-but-few-want-to-defund-them-survey-
finds [https://perma.cc/JV9H-RVJZ] (noting that a majority of survey respondents want individual 
officers held accountable for violations but do not support defunding police departments).  
 309 See Simone Weichselbaum & Nicole Lewis, Support for Defunding the Police Department Is 
Growing. Here’s Why It’s Not a Silver Bullet., MARSHALL PROJECT (June 9, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/09/support-for-defunding-the-police-department-is-
growing-here-s-why-it-s-not-a-silver-bullet [https://perma.cc/N99L-7E6D]; see also @LAPPL, TWITTER 
(June 8, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://twitter.com/lappl/status/1270057916943314944?s=21 
[https://perma.cc/X2LE-BU89] (“Cutting the #LAPD budget means . . . rape, murder [and] assault 
investigations won’t occur or will take forever to complete.”). 
 310 See infra Section I.B; see also Gaby Lion, Note, Bringing Untested Rape Kits out of Storage and 
into the Courtroom: Encouraging the Creation of Public–Private Partnerships to Eliminate the Rape Kit 
Backlog, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1018–21 (2018) (noting that gender bias is a “root cause” of the 
backlog). 
 311 Sam Levin, ‘I Didn’t Think I’d Survive’: Women Tell of Hidden Sexual Abuse by Phoenix Police, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/10/phoenix-
police-officers-rape-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/G9EB-2KPL]. 
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rape cases seriously and to victims that they will truly be treated equally 
under the law.312 
To be clear, this Note does not argue that legislative and fiscal efforts 
should be abandoned but rather that equal protection claims could be an 
additional tool to ensure justice for victims. 313  Milli Kanani Hansen has 
documented how other constitutional remedies, such as substantive or 
procedural due process claims, have been effectively foreclosed.314 Hansen 
argues that, following Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, “it would be 
exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to establish a protected interest in 
investigation [that] would trigger procedural due process protection.” 315 
While a victim could try to claim a property interest in the DNA in her rape 
kit, Supreme Court jurisprudence has made this path unlikely to succeed.316 
Hansen additionally details how courts have been unsympathetic to plaintiffs 
bringing claims alleging violations of their constitutional liberty interests in 
rape kit testing as victims of crimes.317 In terms of substantive due process, 
Hansen notes that in Osborne, the Supreme Court refused to acknowledge a 
due process right to DNA evidence.318 Hansen does leave open the remote 
possibility that a substantive due process claim could be brought under the 
guise of privacy rights,319 but given the current makeup of the Court, this 
seems unlikely. Hansen argues that equal protection claims may be similarly 
futile,320 but her note was written prior to the recent wave of equal protection 
rape kit litigation. 
 
 312 Rape kits have themselves become a “symbol of justice.” Andrea Quinlan, Visions of Public 
Safety, Justice, and Healing: The Making of the Rape Kit Backlog in the United States, 29 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 225, 226 (2020). 
 313 One possibility is that the Department of Justice could even use its authority to investigate police 
departments and bring suits against cities for injunctive relief. See Joe Davidson, Justice Department Has 




 314 See Hansen, supra note 22, at 965–89. 
 315 Id. at 972–74. In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, a woman who had a restraining order against 
her husband was ignored by police when she reported that her husband kidnapped her three children, who 
he ultimately murdered. 545 U.S. 748, 751–54 (2005). The Supreme Court found that she did not have a 
protected property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order and noted the “deep-rooted 
nature of law-enforcement discretion.” Id. at 761, 768. 
 316 Hansen, supra note 22, at 974–77.  
 317 Id. at 977–80.  
 318 Id. at 980–81; Dist. Att’y’s Off. for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55–56 (2009). 
 319 Hansen, supra note 22, at 981. 
 320 Id. at 983–85. 
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Thus, although the continuing problematic use of comparators in equal 
protection claims will be a difficult obstacle to overcome, particularly with 
the Court’s composition today, equal protection claims present a rare 
opportunity for successfully eliminating the backlog and obtaining justice 
for victims. Of course, comparison is necessary to some degree when 
establishing discriminatory treatment of a protected group.321 However, the 
crux of the disagreement between various courts is whether a plaintiff must 
expressly plead the disparate treatment of otherwise similarly situated 
individuals in order to show intent to discriminate. The requirement of 
comparators to show discriminatory intent is embedded in discrimination 
law concerning not only equal protection but also Title VII; therefore, it 
would be difficult to adjust this requirement despite the rulings of various 
circuit courts. However, the comparator requirement is not strictly applied to 
all discrimination cases, even by the Supreme Court. In Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, the Court upheld a Title VII claim that an accounting firm 
discriminated impermissibly against a female employee seeking to become 
partner despite the fact that there was no comparator.322 Instead of relying on 
a comparator, the Court looked to specific sexist remarks made about the 
female employee to find evidence of discriminatory intent.323 Although this 
case was distinct from the equal protection claims on which this Note 
focuses, it demonstrates that the Court is already willing to find intent to 
discriminate without comparators.324 
Legally, it is also consistent with the rulings of various circuit courts to 
establish intent to discriminate without a comparator. Notably, the Sixth 
Circuit opinion in Doe v. City of Memphis adapts the Watson standard based 
on police protections for domestic violence complaints to apply to police 
 
 321 See, e.g., Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“Any equal protection claim is grounded on a comparison between the treatment the state gives similarly 
situated individuals.”). 
 322 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1989) (“We have not in the past required women whose gender has proved 
relevant to an employment decision to establish the negative proposition that they would not have been 
subject to that decision had they been men, and we do not do so today.”); Goldberg, supra note 26, at 
784. 
 323 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (including statements by some partners that she was “macho,” 
that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” that she should take “a course at charm school,” and that, 
“to improve her chances for partnership . . . [she] should ‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, 
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry’”). 
 324 See also Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598–600 (1999) (holding that the 
Americans with Disabilities Act requires states to place mentally disabled individuals in community 
settings rather than in segregated institutions when certain conditions are met); Goldberg, supra note 26, 
at 783 (“[T]he Court [in Olmstead] saw that the segregation of mentally disabled individuals was 
discrimination because of disability not by comparing the act to the treatment of others, but instead by 
looking more broadly at the segregating act’s social meaning and its injurious effect.”). 
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protections for sexual assault complaints. 325  Because the Sixth Circuit 
essentially applies the Watson standard in Doe, the Ninth Circuit’s pleading 
standard in Marlowe is at odds not only with the Sixth Circuit but also with 
the six other circuits that have adopted the Watson standard. Furthermore, a 
class action lawsuit alleging police discrimination against victims of sexual 
assault for not testing rape kits is currently pending appeal in the Fifth 
Circuit. 326  Since the Fifth Circuit has adopted the Watson standard for 
domestic violence cases, it is wholly possible that, if the court accepts the 
case, it will agree with the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning and extend the Watson 
standard to sexual assault claims. The Ninth Circuit has even briefly 
referenced the Watson standard in an opinion.327 It truly defies reason not to 
extend the existing case law regarding the deliberate underenforcement of 
domestic violence to the similar deliberate under-investigation of rape. 
Disparate pleading standards are problematic in part because they distribute 
justice unequally based on where a plaintiff is able to bring a claim. The 
Supreme Court needs to step in to resolve the confusion between the lower 
courts regarding the pleading standard and compensate for the lack of 
scholarship in this area. As more of these cases arise, the Supreme Court 
should take its next opportunity to hold with the Sixth Circuit that 
comparators may be sufficient to show intent to discriminate, but they are 
not necessary. Plaintiffs should be able to state a prima facie equal protection 
claim by alleging a police custom or practice to provide less protection to 
victims of sexual assault than those of other crimes by refusing to investigate 
rape claims and test rape kits, and that gender discrimination was the 
motivation for this discriminatory treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should remove the need for comparators in equal 
protection claims—particularly in cases concerning the denial of police 
protections to victims of sexual assault—because this requirement is 
contrary to precedent and public policy. That the comparator requirement is 
 
 325 928 F.3d 481, 487 (6th Cir. 2019). The Sixth Circuit applied the Watson standard in 2002 in Jones 
v. Union County, 296 F.3d 417, 427–28 (6th Cir. 2002). In Doe, the court cites directly to Jones v. Union 
County to explain the nearly identical standard espoused in Doe. 928 F.3d at 487 (“For a plaintiff to 
succeed on an Equal Protection claim of sex discrimination, she ‘must show that she is a member of a 
protected class and that she was intentionally and purposefully discriminated against because of her 
membership in that protected class.’ . . . The latter showing requires a demonstration that it is the policy 
or custom . . . to provide less protection to victims of sexual assault than those of other crimes, and that 
gender discrimination was the motivation for this disparate treatment.” (quoting Jones v. Union County, 
296 F.3d at 426)). 
 326 Smith Complaint, supra note 13, at 3–5. 
 327 Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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inconsistently defined and inconsistently applied across discrimination cases 
illustrates that comparators should not be strictly necessary to illustrate 
discriminatory intent. This uncertain and piecemeal status quo is detrimental 
to victims and undermines the rule of law by creating a system in which two 
plaintiffs can be subject to different pleading standards based solely on 
where they live. In fact, the comparator requirement could serve to entrench 
inequality by imposing a potentially insurmountable obstacle to women 
attempting to seek redress for the violation of their constitutional rights. 
Mandating specific comparator evidence could deny the possibility of legal 
relief to women who are needlessly suffering at the hands of the criminal 
justice system. 328  Many other constitutional remedies have already been 
foreclosed.329  Additionally, legislative efforts to secure funding have not 
been fruitful because they do not target the root issue of systemic bias.330 
Allowing equal protection claims to move forward would not only provide a 
remedy to individual victims of sexual assault, but it could also improve the 
likelihood of other victims coming forward in the future, 331  thereby 
increasing public safety.332 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he purpose of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person 
within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its 
improper execution through duly constituted agents.”333 The original aim of 
the Equal Protection Clause was to protect citizens from violence through 
providing equal access to police protections.334 The Ninth Circuit’s dismissal 
of Marlowe’s claim flies in the face of this purpose by sanctioning a 
widespread law enforcement culture of denying equal protection to women 
by purposefully deprioritizing rape investigations and failing to test rape kits. 
By enforcing an inconsistent and rigid comparator standard in equal 
 
 328  Better alternatives include looking at the totality of the circumstances to infer intent or 
considering a more flexible comparator standard. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 
2012) (holding that a “flexible, common-sense” comparator standard applies to the “similarly situated” 
prong). 
 329  See supra notes 312–320 and accompanying text. For a more robust discussion of other 
constitutional claims regarding untested rape kits, see Hansen, supra note 22, at 965–89. 
 330 See supra Section I.B. 
 331 Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 11 (“[A] rape victim’s willingness to report an incident to law 
enforcement . . . frequently turns on an appraisal of the probability that—as a starting proposition—she 
will be believed.”). 
 332 Hagerty, supra note 1, at 80 (“I don’t think there will ever be another time in history when so 
many criminals can be arrested so easily, so quickly, so inexpensively, and with such certainty.” 
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tim McGinty, former Cuyahoga County, Ohio prosecutor)). 
 333 Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1917).  
 334 Tuerkheimer, supra note 20, at 1299–1301. 
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protection claims, the Ninth Circuit—as well as any other court that adopts 
this standard—systematically denies women remedies for serious 
constitutional violations. Systematically refusing to test rape kits for 
potentially inculpatory evidence meets the elements to constitute a violation 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution. The Court should uphold the promise of the Equal Protection 
Clause by granting certiorari in a future case and deeming the comparator 
requirement sufficient but not necessary. 
